v0.8.5: Check-CA actually checks Windows now (follow-up to #13)

User on issue #13 reported that even after installing the CA (and
seeing it in the Windows cert manager UI), our 'Check CA' button still
said 'NOT trusted'. Root cause: is_ca_trusted() on Windows was just
returning false unconditionally — Check-CA has never worked on Windows.

Fix: is_trusted_windows() now shells out to certutil:
  certutil -user -store Root 'MasterHttpRelayVPN'
  certutil -store Root 'MasterHttpRelayVPN'

Checks both the user store (where our install_windows puts it by
default) and the machine store (fallback path when user-store install
is blocked). Requires certutil to print the cert name in stdout AND
exit 0 — belt-and-suspenders against locales where certutil exits 0
even on an empty match.

Also made the Check-CA UI message point users at the CA file path
for cross-device install — the same user reported their Android
V2rayNG client getting cert errors on our MITM-signed TLS leaves,
which is the expected 'the phone doesn't trust our CA' scenario. The
message now calls out the ca.crt path explicitly, and notes the
Android 7+ user-CA restriction (Firefox Android works, Chrome and
most apps don't trust user-installed CAs regardless).

Not addressed (by design):
- Replacing our CA keypair with Python-generated PEM fails to parse
  via rcgen. User tried this as a workaround before reporting. rcgen
  expects PKCS#8 PEM; Python's cryptography commonly emits PKCS#1
  ('BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY'). Even if parsing worked, mixing an
  external CA with our leaf-issuing code would break the key match.
  Users should stick with our generated CA — that's the supported
  flow. The Python cross-contamination experiment is expected to
  fail; we don't document it as supported.

Author: therealaleph

Cargo.lock

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "mhrv-rs"
-version = "0.8.4"
+version = "0.8.5"
 edition = "2021"
 description = "Rust port of MasterHttpRelayVPN -- DPI bypass via Google Apps Script relay with domain fronting"
 license = "MIT"

Cargo.toml

@@ -772,9 +772,28 @@ impl eframe::App for App {
                 ui.small(last_test_msg);
             }
             match ca_trusted {
-                Some(true) => { ui.small("CA appears trusted."); },
-                Some(false) => { ui.small("CA is NOT trusted in the system store. Click 'Install CA' (may require admin)."); },
-                None => {},
+                Some(true) => {
+                    ui.small("CA appears trusted on this machine.");
+                }
+                Some(false) => {
+                    ui.small(
+                        "CA is NOT trusted in the system store. Click 'Install CA' \
+                         (may require admin). If you already installed it and this \
+                         still says NO, you may be on an older build — v0.8.5+ \
+                         checks the Windows store correctly.",
+                    );
+                }
+                None => {}
+            }
+            if ca_trusted.is_some() {
+                let ca_path = data_dir::data_dir().join("ca").join("ca.crt");
+                ui.small(format!(
+                    "For other devices (Android, other PCs) connecting through this proxy: \
+                     copy {} and install as a trusted root on that device. On Android 7+ \
+                     most apps ignore user-installed CAs — Firefox Android works; Chrome \
+                     and many others don't.",
+                    ca_path.display()
+                ));
             }
 
             ui.separator();

src/bin/ui.rs

@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ pub fn is_ca_trusted(path: &Path) -> bool {
     match std::env::consts::OS {
         "macos" => is_trusted_macos(),
         "linux" => is_trusted_linux(),
-        "windows" => false,
+        "windows" => is_trusted_windows(),
         _ => false,
     }
 }
@@ -303,6 +303,33 @@ fn is_trusted_linux() -> bool {
 
 // ---------- Windows ----------
 
+/// Check whether our CA is present in the Windows Trusted Root store.
+/// Looks in both the user store (no admin required to install) and the
+/// machine store. Returns true if `certutil -store ... MasterHttpRelayVPN`
+/// finds a match. Issue #13 follow-up: previously this always returned
+/// false on Windows, so the Check-CA button was misleading users into
+/// reinstalling a cert that was already trusted.
+fn is_trusted_windows() -> bool {
+    // `certutil -user -store Root <name>` prints the matching cert entries
+    // on success (stdout), and exits with a non-zero code plus a "Not
+    // found" message if nothing matches. We also check stdout for the
+    // cert name because certutil in some locales returns 0 even on no-
+    // match, just with empty output.
+    for args in [
+        vec!["-user", "-store", "Root", CERT_NAME],
+        vec!["-store", "Root", CERT_NAME],
+    ] {
+        let out = Command::new("certutil").args(&args).output();
+        if let Ok(o) = out {
+            let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&o.stdout);
+            if o.status.success() && stdout.to_ascii_lowercase().contains(&CERT_NAME.to_ascii_lowercase()) {
+                return true;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    false
+}
+
 fn install_windows(cert_path: &str) -> bool {
     // Per-user Root store (no admin required).
     let res = Command::new("certutil")