🛡️ Sentinel: [security improvement] Enforce execution boundaries to prevent DoS

[thirdbase1]

🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: Agentic execution components (ShellTool and AgentConnector) lacked explicit execution boundaries, making the system vulnerable to memory exhaustion via massive shell outputs or hanging external API calls.
🎯 Impact: In autonomous "agent" systems, failure to bound shell executions and network calls can easily cause infinite loops or resource starvation, crashing the parent process or generating massive unexpected costs.
🔧 Fix:

• Added explicit resource limits (timeout: 30000 and maxBuffer: 5MB) to ShellTool's execAsync operations.
• Added explicit timeout: 30000 to AgentConnector's axios configuration for external network requests.
• Appended a critical learning entry to .jules/sentinel.md documenting this agentic architectural vulnerability.
  ✅ Verification: Ran npm run lint, npm run build, and npm run test successfully. Checked compiled artifact changes and cleaned up test.txt.

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PR created automatically by Jules for task 17827553259382684841 started by @thirdbase1

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