Add zizmor for gh action security analysis

[coreycb]

Also fix the following zizmor issues:

• Add persist-credentials: false to all actions/checkout steps (artipacked)
• Fix template injection in pr-request-report-labels.yml by moving pull_request context values to env variables instead of inline expressions
• Replace secrets: inherit in build-daily.yml with explicit secret passing, and declare secrets in shippable_builds.yml workflow_call
• Replace softprops/action-gh-release with gh release create in shippable_builds.yml (superfluous-actions)
• Fix spoofable bot actor check in pr-dependabot-dependency-guard-update.yml
• Fix various issues to tighten up pull_request_target workflows

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[dandarnell]

I'm not 100% of the caveats, but setting persist-credentials to false breaks checkouts when using SSH. Setting it on comm-l10n-unified broke its mirror action, and I suspect it might break actions here as well.

[coreycb]

I'm not 100% of the caveats, but setting persist-credentials to false breaks checkouts when using SSH. Setting it on comm-l10n-unified broke its mirror action, and I suspect it might break actions here as well.

Yeah these changes are almost guaranteed to break something. Maybe they should be phased in to limit the impact. I can split into different patches.