feat: [#248] implement Docker/UFW firewall security strategy#249
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josecelano merged 6 commits intomainfrom Dec 22, 2025
Merged
feat: [#248] implement Docker/UFW firewall security strategy#249josecelano merged 6 commits intomainfrom
josecelano merged 6 commits intomainfrom
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- Add ADR: Docker/UFW firewall security strategy with layered approach - Add Security Analysis section to ADR (threat model, compliance, monitoring, recovery) - Add Research Findings section with Docker official documentation references - Create Docker network segmentation analysis document - Update issue specification Phase 1 (completed) and Phase 2 (in progress) - Add security terms to project dictionary (distroless, HIDS, OSSEC, Wazuh) Phase 1 (Research and Analysis) is now complete with comprehensive documentation of Docker's iptables manipulation, UFW incompatibility, alternative solutions evaluation, and security best practices. The ADR now includes: - 5 attack vectors with risk assessment and mitigation strategies - Compliance framework analysis (OWASP, CIS, PCI-DSS, SOC 2, HIPAA, GDPR) - 6 monitoring/detection mechanisms with example scripts - 6-step incident response and remediation workflow Network segmentation analysis provides detailed evaluation of 3 options with security context about Tracker credentials and Prometheus authentication, recommending three-network segmentation for maximum isolation. Related: #248
- Delete configure-tracker-firewall.yml playbook (Docker bypasses UFW) - Delete ConfigureTrackerFirewallStep implementation - Remove step from configure command handler - Update ConfigureStep enum (remove ConfigureTrackerFirewall variant) - Update base firewall playbook with security comments explaining Docker/UFW interaction - Add ADR reference to system module documentation Since Docker bypasses UFW rules for published container ports, application port firewall rules in UFW are ineffective. Service exposure is controlled via Docker port bindings in docker-compose, not through UFW. UFW is now simplified to its actual effective scope: SSH access only. See ADR: docs/decisions/docker-ufw-firewall-security-strategy.md Related: #248
…nse in depth Replace single backend_network with three isolated networks: - database_network: Tracker ↔ MySQL (reduces attack vectors from 3 to 1) - metrics_network: Tracker ↔ Prometheus (metrics isolation) - visualization_network: Prometheus ↔ Grafana (prevents direct access) Security benefits: - MySQL isolation: Only tracker has database access (least privilege) - Metrics isolation: Grafana must query through Prometheus - Lateral movement prevention: Compromised service cannot access unrelated services - Defense in depth: Network segmentation + authentication + Docker port bindings + UFW Changes: - Modified templates/docker-compose/docker-compose.yml.tera - Replaced backend_network with three segmented networks - Added comprehensive security comments explaining topology and benefits - Services now use minimum required networks for their function - Updated src/infrastructure/templating/docker_compose/template/renderer/docker_compose.rs - Fixed test assertion to check for new metrics_network instead of backend_network - Updated docs/issues/248-docker-ufw-firewall-security-strategy.md - Marked Phase 3.2 as complete with all implementation tasks checked References: - ADR: docs/decisions/docker-ufw-firewall-security-strategy.md - Analysis: docs/analysis/security/docker-network-segmentation-analysis.md All tests pass (1562 passed), pre-commit validation successful (4m 32s)
Created docs/issues/manual-tests/ directory structure for issue-specific
manual testing documentation. This allows detailed test results to be
preserved alongside issue specifications and cleaned up when issues close.
Changes:
- Created docs/issues/manual-tests/248-network-segmentation-test-results.md
with comprehensive test results including:
* Test environment details (VM IP, services, network topology)
* Positive connectivity tests (Tracker→MySQL, Prometheus→Tracker, Grafana→Prometheus)
* Negative isolation tests (Grafana/Prometheus blocked from MySQL)
* Network topology diagram and security analysis
* All tests passed - network segmentation working perfectly
- Added docs/issues/manual-tests/README.md explaining:
* Purpose and usage of manual-tests directory
* File naming convention: {issue-number}-{description}.md
* When to create manual test documentation
* Structure of manual test documents
* Cleanup process when issues close
- Updated docs/issues/248-docker-ufw-firewall-security-strategy.md:
* Linked to new manual test results location
* Marked all validation checklist items complete
- Updated docs/contributing/roadmap-issues.md cleanup process:
* Added step to check docs/issues/manual-tests/ for issue-specific docs
* Remove manual test files when cleaning up closed issues
* Updated commit message example
All manual E2E tests passed successfully:
✅ Positive: Tracker→MySQL, Prometheus→Tracker, Grafana→Prometheus working
✅ Negative: Network isolation blocking unauthorized access
✅ Security objective: 66% reduction in MySQL attack surface (3→1 service)
Phase 3.2 network segmentation implementation validated and production ready.
Updated docs/user-guide/security.md to reflect the correct Docker/UFW security architecture after discovering Docker bypasses UFW rules. Changes: - Documented layered security approach (UFW + Docker networking) - Explained why UFW cannot protect Docker-published ports - Added service exposure strategy (Public/Localhost/Internal) - Documented three-network segmentation architecture - Added security best practices and warnings - Removed incorrect assumptions about UFW protecting Docker ports - Added DO/DON'T sections for security configuration Security architecture now correctly documents: ✅ UFW protects SSH access (instance-level) ✅ Docker port bindings control service exposure (service-level) ✅ Network segmentation isolates service communication ✅ 66% reduction in MySQL attack surface (3→1 service) Phase 5 (Documentation) in progress - user security guide updated.
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Dec 22, 2025
Removed issue #248 documentation files from docs/issues/: - 248-docker-ufw-firewall-security-strategy.md (issue spec) - DRAFT-docker-ufw-firewall-security-strategy.md (draft file) - manual-tests/248-network-segmentation-test-results.md (manual test results) Also updated docs/issues/manual-tests/README.md to remove example references. Issue #248 (Docker/UFW Firewall Security Strategy) has been closed and merged via PR #249, so these documentation files are no longer needed.
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Overview
This PR implements a comprehensive Docker/UFW firewall security strategy to address the critical security issue where Docker bypasses UFW firewall rules.
Problem
Docker manipulates iptables directly, bypassing UFW rules for published container ports. This means services like MySQL and Prometheus can be accidentally exposed publicly even when UFW rules deny access.
Solution
Implemented a layered security approach combining:
Key Changes
Phase 3.1: UFW Cleanup ✅
Phase 3.2: Network Segmentation ✅
database_network: Tracker ↔ MySQL onlymetrics_network: Tracker ↔ Prometheus onlyvisualization_network: Prometheus ↔ Grafana onlyPhase 3.2: Manual E2E Testing ✅
docs/issues/manual-tests/248-network-segmentation-test-results.mdPhase 5: Documentation ✅
docs/user-guide/security.mdwith correct Docker/UFW architectureSecurity Impact
✅ 66% reduction in MySQL attack surface (3 services → 1 service)
✅ Network isolation prevents lateral movement
✅ Production-ready implementation validated
✅ All manual E2E tests passed
Testing
Documentation
docs/issues/248-docker-ufw-firewall-security-strategy.mddocs/issues/manual-tests/248-network-segmentation-test-results.mddocs/user-guide/security.mddocs/decisions/docker-ufw-firewall-security-strategy.mddocs/analysis/security/docker-network-segmentation-analysis.mdRelated
Ready for review and merge - All implementation and testing complete, production-ready.