fix(webapp): sanitize streamed agent URLs before rendering in the agent view (#3882)

## Summary

The dashboard's Agent view rendered `source-url` and `file` message
parts by putting their `url` straight into an `href`/`src`. Those URLs
come from streamed agent and tool data, so a tool that emitted something
like `javascript:alert(1)` produced a clickable XSS payload in the
dashboard.

## Fix

A `toSafeUrl` helper now gates every URL before it reaches an
`href`/`src`: it allows only `http:`/`https:`/`blob:` (and
`data:image/...` for inline images) and returns `null` for anything
else. Unsafe values render as plain text instead of a link or image, so
a hostile or malformed URL degrades gracefully rather than becoming
clickable. Safe URLs render exactly as before. Covered by a unit test
over the allow/deny list.

Author: ericallam

.server-changes/sanitize-agent-view-urls.md

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+---
+area: webapp
+type: fix
+---
+
+Sanitize URLs from streamed agent and tool data before rendering them in the dashboard's Agent view, so an unsafe scheme such as `javascript:` can no longer produce a clickable link or image source.

apps/webapp/app/components/runs/v3/agent/AgentMessageView.tsx

@@ -77,6 +77,27 @@ export const MessageBubble = memo(function MessageBubble({
   return null;
 });
 
+// URLs in `source-url`/`file` parts come from streamed agent/tool data, so an
+// unsafe scheme like `javascript:` would become a clickable XSS payload once it
+// reaches an href/src. Allow only http(s)/blob (and data: for inline images),
+// and return null for anything else so the caller can skip the link/image.
+export function toSafeUrl(value: unknown, allowDataImage = false): string | null {
+  if (typeof value !== "string") return null;
+  let parsed: URL;
+  try {
+    parsed = new URL(value);
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+  if (parsed.protocol === "http:" || parsed.protocol === "https:" || parsed.protocol === "blob:") {
+    return value;
+  }
+  if (allowDataImage && parsed.protocol === "data:" && /^data:image\//i.test(value)) {
+    return value;
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
 export function renderPart(part: UIMessage["parts"][number], i: number) {
   const p = part as any;
   const type = part.type as string;
@@ -159,15 +180,25 @@ export function renderPart(part: UIMessage["parts"][number], i: number) {
 
   // Source URL — clickable citation link
   if (type === "source-url") {
+    const safeUrl = toSafeUrl(p.url);
+    const label = p.title || p.url;
+    // Unsafe scheme: render the citation text without a clickable link.
+    if (!safeUrl) {
+      return label ? (
+        <div key={i} className="text-xs text-text-dimmed">
+          {label}
+        </div>
+      ) : null;
+    }
     return (
       <div key={i} className="text-xs">
         <a
-          href={p.url}
+          href={safeUrl}
           target="_blank"
           rel="noopener noreferrer"
           className="text-indigo-400 underline hover:text-indigo-300"
         >
-          {p.title || p.url}
+          {label}
         </a>
       </div>
     );
@@ -187,19 +218,37 @@ export function renderPart(part: UIMessage["parts"][number], i: number) {
   if (type === "file") {
     const isImage = typeof p.mediaType === "string" && p.mediaType.startsWith("image/");
     if (isImage) {
+      const safeSrc = toSafeUrl(p.url, true); // allow data: URIs for inline images
+      // Unsafe scheme: fall back to the filename, matching the non-image branch.
+      if (!safeSrc) {
+        return p.filename ? (
+          <div key={i} className="text-xs text-text-dimmed">
+            {p.filename}
+          </div>
+        ) : null;
+      }
       return (
         <img
           key={i}
-          src={p.url}
+          src={safeSrc}
           alt={p.filename ?? "file"}
           className="max-h-64 rounded border border-charcoal-650"
         />
       );
     }
+    const safeUrl = toSafeUrl(p.url);
+    // Unsafe scheme: show the filename without a clickable download link.
+    if (!safeUrl) {
+      return p.filename ? (
+        <div key={i} className="text-xs text-text-dimmed">
+          {p.filename}
+        </div>
+      ) : null;
+    }
     return (
       <div key={i} className="text-xs">
         <a
-          href={p.url}
+          href={safeUrl}
           target="_blank"
           rel="noopener noreferrer"
           className="text-indigo-400 underline hover:text-indigo-300"

apps/webapp/test/components/runs/v3/agent/AgentMessageView.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { toSafeUrl } from "~/components/runs/v3/agent/AgentMessageView";
+
+describe("toSafeUrl", () => {
+  it("allows http(s) and blob URLs", () => {
+    expect(toSafeUrl("https://example.com/x")).toBe("https://example.com/x");
+    expect(toSafeUrl("http://example.com/x")).toBe("http://example.com/x");
+    expect(toSafeUrl("blob:https://example.com/uuid")).toBe("blob:https://example.com/uuid");
+  });
+
+  it("rejects javascript: and other dangerous schemes", () => {
+    expect(toSafeUrl("javascript:alert(1)")).toBeNull();
+    expect(toSafeUrl("JavaScript:alert(1)")).toBeNull();
+    expect(toSafeUrl("vbscript:msgbox(1)")).toBeNull();
+    expect(toSafeUrl("file:///etc/passwd")).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it("rejects data: URLs unless inline images are explicitly allowed", () => {
+    const dataImage = "";
+    expect(toSafeUrl(dataImage)).toBeNull();
+    expect(toSafeUrl(dataImage, true)).toBe(dataImage);
+    // Only image data is allowed, even in image context — never data:text/html.
+    expect(toSafeUrl("data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>", true)).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it("rejects relative URLs and non-string/malformed input", () => {
+    expect(toSafeUrl("/relative/path")).toBeNull();
+    expect(toSafeUrl("not a url")).toBeNull();
+    expect(toSafeUrl(undefined)).toBeNull();
+    expect(toSafeUrl(null)).toBeNull();
+    expect(toSafeUrl(42)).toBeNull();
+  });
+});