ci: pin GitHub Actions to server SHAs and add hidden-unicode lint#2016
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ci: pin GitHub Actions to server SHAs and add hidden-unicode lint#2016
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Orca Security Scan Summary
| Status | Check | Issues by priority | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Infrastructure as Code | View in Orca | ||
| SAST | View in Orca | ||
| Secrets | View in Orca | ||
| Vulnerabilities | View in Orca |
Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## main #2016 +/- ##
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- Coverage 87.95% 87.92% -0.03%
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Files 280 280
Lines 21664 21666 +2
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- Hits 19054 19050 -4
- Misses 2610 2616 +6 ☔ View full report in Codecov by Sentry. 🚀 New features to boost your workflow:
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Align all uses: refs to the immutable commit SHAs used by weaviate/weaviate. Major versions bumped where necessary: checkout v6, docker/login v4, upload-artifact v7, download-artifact v8, cache v5. Tags preserved as comments. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Delegates the trojan-source / hidden-unicode scan to the weaviate/weaviate/.github/actions/security-lint composite action shipped in weaviate/weaviate#11093, pinned to its merge commit (3e52fc80a244f4644d4facc6a4e705ea6eda9039). Uses pull_request_target so the workflow definition runs from the base branch and PR-controlled refs are never executed; the composite fetches the diff via the GitHub API.
dirkkul
approved these changes
Apr 29, 2026
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Summary
uses:refs in GitHub Actions workflows to the same commit SHAs used byweaviate/weaviate, so this client stays in lockstep with the server# v6) as a trailing comment for readability.github/workflows/pr-security-lint.yamlthat scans every PR diff for hidden Unicode / trojan-source characters by delegating to the reusable composite shipped in ci: delegate SHA-pinning to native policy, expose unicode scan as composite weaviate#11093 (pinned to merge commit3e52fc80a244f4644d4facc6a4e705ea6eda9039)Context
Two complementary layers of GitHub Actions hardening:
weaviate/weaviateis invoked here so all five Weaviate SDKs share one implementation.Security notes for the new workflow
pull_request_targetruns the workflow definition from the base branch, never from the PR.permissions: {}at workflow level;pull-requests: readis the only grant.Tradeoffs of delegating to an upstream composite
Pros
pull_request_targetruns the workflow definition from the base branch and the composite never checks out PR-controlled refs — a malicious PR can't alter the linter that's checking it.permissions: {}at workflow level,pull-requests: readat job level, no secrets referenced.Cons
weaviate/weaviate/.github/actions/security-lintbreaks all 5 clients until the SHA is bumped.pull_request_targetis a foot-gun — a future editor addingref: pull_request.head.shaor referencing a secret would re-introduce the attack surface this design is built to avoid. The file header warns against it, but the discipline lives in the reviewer.weaviate/weaviaterather than this repo, so debugging a false positive requires hopping to another repo to read the script.Test plan
pr-security-lintjob runs on this PR and passes (clean diff)🤖 Generated with Claude Code