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W3C-VCDM - preferred credential format for EUBW#26

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W3C-VCDM - preferred credential format for EUBW#26
rkxx wants to merge 8 commits into
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spherity:feat/adr-vcdm

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@rkxx
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@rkxx rkxx commented Nov 14, 2025

The purpose of this ADR is to clarify the use of the W3C-VCDM credential format within the context of the EUBW. For various reasons, it is recommended that W3C-VCDM be defined as the preferred credential format for the EUBW. It allows use case owners to select the most suitable credential format for their particular use case, as it removes the exclusive use of mDOC and SD-JWT-VC for PID, LPID and QEAA.

rkxx added 8 commits November 7, 2025 17:38
Expanded the document to detail the preferred EUBW attestation format, including context, decisions, and consequences related to semantic interoperability and use cases.
Clarified the limitations of current attestation formats regarding global semantic interoperability and emphasized the importance of using existing global vocabularies. Recommended using VCDM2.0 as the preferred attestation format to minimize complexity.
Updated the document to clarify the preferred attestation format and the requirements for use case owners. Enhanced descriptions of use cases and the implications of using different attestation formats.
Updated SC2 use case description to include details about credentials and authorization policies for the DSP protocol.
Update attestation formats and terminology in EUBW document
Expanded on the limitations of current attestation formats and emphasized the importance of semantic interoperability. Added details on the capabilities of JSON-LD and the benefits of using W3C-VCDM credentials.
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cstoecker commented Nov 14, 2025

I support ADR “W3C-VCDM – preferred credential format for EUBW – PR#26” and visualized my argument.

The chart below shows why this is necessary.

Industrial data for Industry 4.0, supply chains, DPPs and data spaces sits in a different dimension than personal data. It is high-volume, diverse and semantically rich. Personal data is low-volume and simple.

A credential format designed for simple, low-volume personal IDs (e.g., "10 attributes on a personal identity cards") cannot support the data structures needed for industrial use cases.

Recent research confirms this gap.

The International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics 2023 (UN Industrial Development Organization) describes the scale and diversity of industrial data across global sectors. It spans sensors, compliance artefacts and operational documents. These data sets require strong semantic models and linking mechanisms. This aligns with the PR: SD-JWT and mDoc cannot express linked data structures or global vocabularies needed for used cases in industrial uses cases and professional / financial services.

Studies from IBM Research show that industrial data lakes become unmanageable without semantic enrichment. Semantic models are needed to link heterogeneous data and avoid “data swamps.” This matches the PR’s argument that industrial attestations must support global vocabularies, JSON-LD framing, and canonicalization.

Work from RWTH Aachen on data spaces (Gaia-X, IDS) also confirms that semantic interoperability is a core requirement. Industrial actors need credentials that can reference global vocabularies and link entities, devices and roles. This is central for KYC/KYB, authorization chains and automated actors. It is also central for SC1, SC2 and PA3 in WE BUILD.

W3C-VCDM is the only format that provides JSON-LD (or the likes such as CBOR-LD, which will be considered as a further alternative for future refinements), semantic linking, framing and canonicalization. These capabilities are needed for corporate identity, delegation, KYC/KYS/AML structures, market roles, license to operate, EHS, certification credentials, "trusted AI", and cross-border interoperability. SD-JWT and mDoc alone cannot meet these needs.

For these reasons, the PR’s proposal to define W3C-VCDM as the preferred attestation format for the EUBW is justified and necessary.

2x2 Matrix Semantic Richness - Spherity GmbH - Dr  Carsten Stöcker - EUBW Credential Format - JSON-LD

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georgepadayatti commented Nov 14, 2025

Thank you for the detailed proposal. One clarification may help refine this ADR. W3C VCDM is a semantic data model, not an attestation format. It defines how claims are structured and semantically represented, but it does not prescribe the serialisation format, proof mechanism, signature scheme, or transport. VCDM-based claims can therefore be conveyed within several envelopes, including JWT-VC, SD-JWT-VC, or COSE-based formats.

For this reason, it may be more accurate to frame the ADR as “Specify the Semantic Data Model and Attestation Formats for the EUBW EAA”. This allows a clear comparison of the attestation formats already used in the EUDI ecosystem, such as ISO/IEC mdoc and JSON-based formats like SD-JWT-VC or JWT-VC, while treating the semantic layer, including VCDM, as a separate concern.

This avoids positioning VCDM as a competing format and maintains a clear separation between:

  • the attestation envelope,
  • the proof mechanism, and
  • the semantic data model.

It also preserves flexibility for use-case owners to select suitable combinations without increasing the number of attestation models the wallet must support.

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cstoecker commented Nov 15, 2025

Why a coherent EUBW VC stack is key for technical robustness, economic value and global B2B digital trust corridors

Across European and global data‑space initiatives, global trade & customs, supply chain and Industry 4.0 ecosystem, W3C VCDM‑based verifiable credentials are already used in production and in large pilots. In these ecosystems, VCDM is not treated as a “purely semantic add‑on”, but as the effective credential format that wallets, connectors, and trust frameworks implement and test against.

Ronald’s ADR is not about just another low‑volume (and low-value) "consumer" (or even a corporate director) use case like “opening a bank account” that the "current natural person EUDI wallet" communication often highlights.

It is about the high‑volume, high‑value data transaction layer of the EU economy: business‑to‑business and machine‑to‑machine flows in data spaces, DPP infrastructures, Industry 4.0, supply chains, dual use goods, civilian-military-supply-chain, and ZTA‑driven critical infrastructure, exactly where the Commission now positions the European Business Wallet as “the cornerstone of doing business simply and digitally in the EU” and as a horizontal enabler to cut regulatory overhead.

In its new International Digital Strategy, the Commission states that digital identity wallets and trust services based on the EU Digital Identity Wallet specifications should be “at the core of an interoperable and scalable suite of digital building blocks and solutions” in partner countries and enable seamless cross‑border use of trust services and digital public infrastructure with partners such as Canada, South Korea, Ukraine, Moldova, the Western Balkans, Japan, India and Egypt.

Through digital partnerships and digital trade agreements with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Canada and others, the EU is building de‑facto digital data‑sharing and trust corridors focused on trusted data flows, digital identity, digital trade and mutual recognition of electronic documents and signatures.

For these corridors the real volume and macro‑economic value will come from B2B and M2M transactions, not from low‑volume consumer use cases, and they will only scale if the EUBW rests on widely and globally accepted standards for credentials and proofs for B2B and M2M that integrate cleanly with the VCDM‑based stacks industry and international partners are already deploying.

The Commission’s own impact work expects that current fragmented reporting and compliance processes destroy productivity on the order of trillions per year, and that a common wallet (and EUBW + DPP infrastructure) for economic operators should reduce administrative burden, enable wallet‑by‑default regulatory interactions and support secure cross‑border data sharing for permits, licences, certificates and VAT registrations.

This is exactly the space where a coherent VCDM + Data Integrity stack for the EUBW can deliver straight‑through processing (STP) of compliance controls and provenance, and where a nested, format‑fragmented approach would re‑create the very complexity and transaction costs the initiative is supposed to remove while establising enourmous technical adoption burdens.

When we treat the EUBW as an identity meta‑platform in the sense of “Cooperation Beats Aggregation” – a shared trust fabric that sits behind and between DPPs, data spaces, ERP systems and OT networks – each additional ecosystem that adopts the same credential profile does not just add its own value, it multiplies the value of all others through network‑of‑networks effects.

That is why we argue for an adoption strategy that plugs EUBW‑ready, VCDM‑based solutions into large industrial pilots and production ecosystems now (Catena‑X, energy data‑X, UNTP‑based DPPs, sectoral data spaces), so that the wallet can be battle‑tested at industrial scale, deliver immediate macro‑economic benefits, and build crypto‑agile foundations for the upcoming PQC transition in a single, coherent architecture instead of many incompatible layers.

1. Ecosystems already using W3C VCDM credentials

1.1 Overview table

Below is a non‑exhaustive, fact‑based table of ecosystems that depend on W3C VCDM credentials today.

Region Ecosystem / Project Domain / Use case Credential profile in practice Status / notes
Germany / EU Catena‑X / Manufacturing‑X Automotive & industrial data spaces (self‑descriptions, membership, services, DPP) Verifiable Credentials based on W3C VCDM, JSON‑LD contexts and Gaia‑X ontology; credential format section extends VCDM 2.0 for Gaia‑X. (Gaia-X Docs) Operational data spaces; compliance and onboarding use VCs as defined by Gaia‑X credential format docs.
Germany Energy Data‑X (energy data‑X) Energy data space & critical infrastructure Bundesanzeiger provides verified digital information from primary registers as “Verifiable Credentials” for identity, authorisation, provenance in energy sector. (Energy data-X) Funded national project; part of Manufacturing‑X family; Spherity implements an EUBW‑ready wallet with PQC and VCs.
Germany / EU Chem‑X & Digital Material Passport Chemicals, circularity, sustainability Verification guideline stresses credential‑based verification, PKI, registry services, and references W3C Verifiable Credentials and data‑space projects like Catena‑X. (TFS Initiative) Chem‑X is part of Manufacturing‑X and is building on VC‑based verification for the chemical sector.
EU / multi‑sector Gaia‑X Trust Framework Cross‑sector data spaces Gaia‑X uses W3C Verifiable Credentials and Presentations as trust backbone. Credential format spec extends VCDM 2.0 and explicitly relies on JSON‑LD contexts. (Gaia-X Docs) Gaia‑X “Lighthouse Data Spaces” are already operational; credentials are JSON‑LD VCs per the trust framework. (Gaia-X)
EU / Global UN Transparency Protocol (UNTP) – DPP & Conformity Digital Product Passport, conformity, facility, traceability UNTP DPP spec: “All DPPs are issued as W3C Verifiable Credentials and MUST conform to VCDM 2.0”, with JSON‑LD @context and type for all identified objects. (UNCEFACT) Targets global supply chains; strongly aligned with EU DPP agenda.
EU Battery DPP initiatives (BatteryPass, CIRPASS, Trace4EU) Batteries, circular economy, DPP DPP landscape and research papers describe DPPs as Verifiable Credentials based on W3C VCDM, often JSON‑LD and linked vocabularies. (cirpassproject.eu) Multiple EU projects (BatteryPass, CIRPASS) build their DPP concepts on W3C VCs.
EU DSSC & EU sectoral data spaces Horizontal trust for data spaces DSSC guidance: VCs are key elements for SSI‑based trust; many data‑space blueprints build on W3C VCs for identity and authorisation. (Interoperable Europe Portal) DSSC is the reference for Common European Data Spaces.
Global UNTP‑based DPP provider ecosystems Trade, logistics, emissions, sustainability UNTP implementation docs and example code show DPPs, facility records and events as W3C VCDM 2.0 JSON‑LD credentials. (UNCEFACT)  
Global SSI / JSON‑LD VC stacks (Aries, ACA‑Py, DIIP, etc.) Horizontal SSI & identity Aries and similar stacks have first‑class support for JSON‑LD credentials with Linked Data proofs. DIIP explicitly plans support for SD‑JWT‑VCLD on top of existing JSON‑LD VCs, not instead of them. (aca-py.org)  
US / Global US DHS CBP – SVIP Global Interoperability Standards (GIS) Global trade, customs, supply chain traceability Uses decentralized identifiers (DIDs) and W3C VCDM‑based verifiable credentials (JSON‑LD) in DHS S&T SVIP pilots and CBP’s Global Interoperability Standards (GIS) tests for customs and trade data exchange. CBP’s 2024–2025 GIS plan and SVIP supply chain traceability projects use DIDs and VCs to modernise customs processes, improve cross‑border visibility and test W3C‑based interoperability for global trade.
Japan Japan DVCC – DID/VC Co‑Creation Consortium Financial services, trusted web, cross‑sector digital identity Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) and Verifiable Credentials (VCs) following W3C and IETF specifications; focus on interoperability rules and business‑grade deployment of DID/VC in the Japanese market DVCC (Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking, NTT Data, ITOCHU Techno Solutions, TOPPAN Digital, Hakuhodo Keithley, Hitachi, Fujitsu, Anderson Mori & Tomotsune) was founded to promote social implementation of DID/VC, develop interoperability rules, and align with global standards for a “Trusted Web” and SSI‑style ecosystems.
Canada UCVDCC & Pan‑Canadian Trust Framework (PCTF) digital credentials ecosystem Government digital ID, organisational credentials, supply‑chain and public‑sector services W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model with JSON‑LD, DIDs and Linked Data Proofs; UCVDCC explicitly lists W3C VCDM, DIDs, JSON‑LD, LD Proofs and related APIs as core standards for the Canadian digital credential ecosystem The User‑Centric Verifiable Digital Credential Challenge (UCVDCC) and PCTF aim to align Canadian public‑sector and industry on a shared trust framework; BC’s Digital Trust and BC Wallet already issue and verify VCs in production (OrgBook, Verifiable Organizations Network), demonstrating large‑scale use of W3C VC‑based credentials for organisations and services.

Key observation:
For these ecosystems, a “VC” is in practice “VCDM 2.x JSON‑LD credential secured with a Data Integrity proof or a similar Linked Data‑oriented signature”. The semantics and the proof are tightly coupled to JSON‑LD and RDF graphs.

Across these ecosystems, VCDM + JSON‑LD is treated as the concrete credential format secured with a Data Integrity proof or a similar Linked Data‑oriented signature. The semantics and the proof are tightly coupled to JSON‑LD and RDF graphs. The semantics and the serialisation are what implementations actually depend on.

For EUBW this implies:

If an EUBW wallet cannot natively issue and verify VCDM JSON‑LD credentials with their own proofs, it cannot connect cleanly to UNTP DPPs, Gaia‑X credentials, Catena‑X data‑exchange contracts, or emerging energy data spaces. This would actually be very disadvantageous for adoption.

2. Why we recommend Data Integrity proofs (and not SD‑JWT / COSE) for EUBW

2.1 What W3C and ETSI say about Data Integrity and VCDM 2.0

  • W3C VCDM 2.0 explicitly supports multiple cryptographic proof formats, including Data Integrity proofs and VC‑JWT, to secure credentials.
  • The Verifiable Credentials Data Integrity 1.0 specification defines a procedure to ensure authenticity and integrity of VCs and similar documents, using cryptographic proofs attached directly to the JSON‑LD (or JSON) object.

ETSI TR 119 476 (v1.2.1 and v1.3.1) is very explicit for the European context:

  • VCDM 2.0 with JSON‑LD encoding can be combined with VC Data Integrity 1.0 underpinned by an ISO‑standardised BBS+ signature variant for selective disclosure.
  • VCDM 1.1 with JWT encoding cannot be supported by that ISO BBS+ Data Integrity stack.

This is important: ETSI and ISO standardisation efforts are actively converging on VCDM JSON‑LD + Data Integrity + BBS+ as the path for:

  • high‑assurance signatures,
  • advanced selective disclosure,
  • and ZKP‑style privacy properties.

2.2 Why Data Integrity is technically a better fit than SD‑JWT/COSE for EUBW

From a technical perspective, Data Integrity proofs have properties that are critical for industrial/B2B environments:

  1. Proofs over canonicalised semantics

    • Data Integrity cryptosuites perform deterministic canonicalisation (for JSON‑LD, an RDF Dataset Canonicalization) before signing.
    • Signatures are bound to the semantics of the graph, not to incidental JSON formatting.
      For industrial use (Catena‑X, Gaia‑X policy reasoning, UNTP):
    • Credentials are processed by many systems, transformed, framed, or merged into graphs.
    • Policy engines act on RDF triples and JSON‑LD frames, not raw JSON strings.

    SD‑JWT and COSE‑based JWTs usually sign JSON directly (with at most a simple JSON canonicalisation). This is fine for simple claims, but does not align well with graph‑based semantics and heavy transformation.

  2. Tight integration with JSON‑LD and linked data

    • Data Integrity proofs are designed to work natively with JSON‑LD, @context, @id, and @type.
    • They support proofs over graphs, matching how UNTP DPPs, Gaia‑X credentials and Catena‑X assets are modelled.

    SD‑JWT‑VC defines its own data model for SD‑JWT payloads and focuses on JSON claim structures. It does not integrate with JSON‑LD processing and RDF semantics; any mapping is extra work.

  3. Selective disclosure and ZK support (BBS+ and other cryptosuites)

    • Data Integrity proofs can use BBS+ and similar schemes for advanced selective disclosure and unlinkability.
    • This is important where we want to reveal minimal data (e.g. “is Gaia‑X compliant and member of this data space”) while keeping full credentials confidential.

    SD‑JWT also supports selective disclosure, but:

    • It works on hashed JSON claims, not RDF‑level semantics.#
    • It does not directly align with graph‑level selective disclosure.
  4. Alignment with EU trust‑service and eIDAS‑style requirements

    • ETSI TR 119 476 discusses W3C VCs and highlights that VCDM 2.0 + Data Integrity + BBS+ maps cleanly to ISO‑standardised BBS+.
    • This is the path for qualified EAA‑level credentials and high‑assurance signatures in EU infrastructures.

    For EUBW, which must live in the eIDAS 2.0 and ETSI world, aligning with the Data Integrity / BBS+ trajectory is the safest path.

  5. Simpler mental model for wallets and policy engines

    With Data Integrity proofs, the picture is:

    • One data model: VCDM JSON‑LD graph.
    • One canonicalisation model: JSON‑LD / RDF dataset canonicalisation.
    • One proof family: Data Integrity cryptosuites (ECDSA, EdDSA, BBS+, later PQC).

    Policy engines and verifiers need to:

    • Parse JSON‑LD;
    • Build or query RDF;
    • Verify Data Integrity proofs.

    This matches how Gaia‑X policy engines are already built (RDF + SPARQL + JSON‑LD VCs).

    Adding SD‑JWT/COSE as a second proof layer introduces:

    • Extra canonicalisation rules (JCS, JOSE headers, etc.),
    • Additional error conditions in verification,
    • More complex certification and security reviews.

For these reasons, we suggest that EUBW should treat “VCDM JSON‑LD + Data Integrity proofs” as the preferred cryptographic binding for its own credential format, especially for industrial and B2B scope.

3. Why SD‑JWT‑VC and mDoc are not “drop‑in” compatible with these ecosystems

Formally, you are right:

  • VCDM 2.0 defines a data model.
  • SD‑JWT‑VC defines a separate credential format with its own data model and media types.
  • mDoc defines an ISO‑regulated mobile document format.

But the industrial ecosystems examples listed above have not adopted SD‑JWT‑VC or mDoc as their main formats:

  • UNTP DPP defines a W3C VCDM profile, vocabularies and JSON‑LD contexts; passports and conformity credentials are published as W3C VCs.
  • Gaia‑X credentials are W3C VCs with JSON‑LD semantics and contexts; policy reasoning uses RDF and JSON‑LD.
  • Catena‑X uses VCs for PCF verification and data‑exchange contracts; identity wallets store these VCs.

SD‑JWT‑VC and mDoc have different assumptions:

  • SD‑JWT‑VC defines a JSON structure optimised for SD‑JWT, not for JSON‑LD/RDF.
  • mDoc is optimised for mobile driving licences and similar personal credentials, using CBOR+COSE and ISO namespaces.

Mapping from VCDM JSON‑LD to SD‑JWT‑VC or mDoc would require:

  • Flattening or re‑encoding graphs into trees,
  • Maintaining separate schema definitions for SD‑JWT‑VC,
  • Custom mapping logic in every verifier and policy engine.

Some bridging profiles show how to combine SD‑JWT with W3C VCs, but that is done by additional mapping and profiles, not by native equivalence.

For WE BUILD and EUBW, this means:

  • For personal flows, SD‑JWT‑VC and/or mDoc may be reasonable choices.
  • For EUBW B2B / industrial flows, we should not assume SD‑JWT‑VC or mDoc can replace VCDM JSON‑LD credentials without very significant technical and economic cost.

4. Why nested formats are technically disadvantageous

By “nested formats” we mean designs where:

  • A VCDM JSON‑LD VC is embedded as a blob inside an SD‑JWT‑VC or mDoc, or
  • A VCDM graph is transformed into a flat JSON structure for SD‑JWT‑VC, and later “re‑graphified”.

4.1 Two layers of modelling and proof logic

In such designs, verification requires:

  1. Verification of the outer envelope (SD‑JWT / COSE / mDoc), including SD logic and JOSE/COSE signatures.
  2. Reconstruction and verification of the inner VCDM JSON‑LD graph and its Data Integrity proof.

This doubles:

  • Canonicalisation rules (JCS vs RDF dataset canonicalisation),
  • Proof suites and code paths,
  • Security review and test coverage.

In Industry 4.0, supply chain, and data‑space runtimes, policy engines already assume VCs as the trust input. Adding a nested layer increases complexity without any real benefit for industrial use cases.

4.2 Catena‑X / DPP example

Catena‑X DPP and PCF flows rely on:

  • DPPs and PCF verification statements as VCs,
  • Identity wallets managed by data consumers and providers,
  • Policy evaluation over the presence and content of these VCs.

If we embed VCDM‑style DPP credentials inside SD‑JWT‑VC, each participant must:

  • Parse the SD‑JWT,
  • Extract and re‑interpret the embedded JSON‑LD object,
  • Rebuild the graph to match the semantics used by Catena‑X aspects and Gaia‑X policies.

All existing tooling that expects top‑level JSON‑LD VCs must be updated. The risk of subtle bugs in signature verification and policy evaluation increases.

4.3 Energy data‑X / machine identity example

For energy data‑X:

  • Machine identities and grid assets need to be authorised in (near) real time.
  • These assets and their operators are represented by credentials from qualified registries and domain authorities.

If VCDM JSON‑LD credentials are the primary format:

  • Gateways and policy engines can verify Data Integrity proofs directly.
  • Authorisation decisions can be based on graph relationships and vocabularies.

If VCDM is nested or transformed into other formats, gateways must:

  • Support both SD‑JWT‑VC (or mDoc) and VCDM+Data Integrity,
  • Implement transformations under time constraints,
  • Deal with performance overhead and broader attack surface.

For critical infrastructure, this added complexity is a clear downside.

5. Credential chaining and why format switching breaks efficiency

Credential chaining is essential for EUBW:

  • AML / KYC / KYB: Legal Person Identity Credential → Legal Person KYC VC → UBO / ownership structure VC → Delegation VC.
  • PoA for Natural Persons / AI Agents: Legal Person Identity Credential → PoA Credential 1 → PoA Credential 2
  • Data spaces and ZTA: Legal Person Identity Credential → KYC Credential → Data‑space membership → Purpose‑bound authorisation credential.
  • DPP provenance: Facility VC → Conformity VC → Shipment event VC → DPP VC.

Research and practical work on SSI and delegated authority underline the importance of chained credentials for scalable trust and provenance.

If we mix formats in these chains, we introduce:

  • Different identifier conventions (id in JSON‑LD vs sub in JWT vs ISO mDoc elements),
  • Different ways to express typed relations,
  • The need for ad‑hoc mappings at each step.

Using VCDM JSON‑LD + Data Integrity throughout the chain means:

  • One uniform model for linking credentials (id, credentialSubject, typed relations via JSON‑LD contexts),
  • Policy engines can follow these links as graph edges,
  • Chaining logic (including revocation and status checks) is easier to implement and test.

Given that credential chaining is already hard, format switching inside chains adds unnecessary complexity and risk.

6. Security, Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) and industrial B2B

For industrial ZTA, we need:

  • Continuous, policy‑based decisions at gateways.
  • Rich, verifiable attributes about organisations, devices, services and data products.
  • Provenance and delegation chains as part of authorisation.

In practice, this means:

  • Policy engines consume VCs from registries, sector authorities and data spaces.
  • These VCs carry identity, membership, roles, asset classifications, compliance status, etc.

Data Integrity proofs help here because:

  • They work directly on the JSON‑LD representation that policy engines already understand.
  • They align with ETSI/ISO work on high‑assurance signatures (including BBS+).
  • They support ZK and selective disclosure in a way that fits graph‑based credentials.

From a security engineering perspective, it is safer if industrial ZTA chains are built on one data model + one proof family.

Right now, the only option that satisfies:

  • industrial semantics and graph needs,
  • EU trust‑service alignment,
  • data‑space/ Industry 4.0 / Supply Chain interoperability,
  • and selective disclosure / ZK potential,

is VCDM JSON‑LD + Data Integrity proofs.

7. The “tiny red dot vs very huge orange ocean” – human vs industrial scope

Note: The following section refers to the 2x2 Matrix as depicted in my previous Github comment.

We fully recognise:

  • SD‑JWT‑VC and mDoc solve important problems for personal identity (PID/LPID), especially in browser and mobile flows with small attribute sets and strong privacy requirements.

But EUBW is driven by different needs:

  • Legal persons, data spaces, DPPs, supply chains, critical infrastructure, M2M identities, digital twins and ZTA.

In our diagram, the super tiny red dot is human‑centric PID/LPID with ~10 attributes.

The super huge orange ocean is industrial data: multi‑layer graphs, high volume, rich semantics.

Designing an industrial wallet by starting from a browser‑origin format optimised for the red dot and pushing it on the ocean is extremly risky and naive.

From a requirements point of view, we MUST:

  • Start from industrial requirements for legal persons (BU1, SC1, SC2, PA3, ZTA, CirPass2, Data Spaces, UNTP, US DHS, global initiatives, provenance, and Trusted AI).
  • Evaluate candidate credential stacks.
  • Make an informed decision to select the format that can represent the orange ocean robustly to unlock a trillion macro-economic impact.

Note: UNTP, Gaia‑X, Catena‑X and related data spaces have already done such evaluations and converged on VCDM JSON‑LD credentials as their base.

8. Why we still argue to position VCDM + Data Integrity as an attestation format for EUBW

Formally:

  • VCDM 2.0 defines the data model.
  • Data Integrity 1.0 defines the proof framework and cryptosuites.

From a wallet and ecosystem viewpoint, the combination:

  • VCDM 2.0 (JSON‑LD) +
  • VC Data Integrity cryptosuites (e.g. ECDSA, EdDSA, BBS+)
    is a concrete, widely used credential format profile:
  • UNTP and its DPPs rely on W3C VCs (VCDM JSON‑LD) as the credential format for product passports and conformity credentials.
  • Gaia‑X credentials are W3C VCs with JSON‑LD contexts and Data Integrity‑style proofs.
  • Catena‑X, energy data‑X and other initiatives assume this style of VC as their core trust mechanism.

For the EUBW architecture, it is therefore practical and accurate to speak of:

“VCDM JSON‑LD credentials with Data Integrity proofs” as a preferred EUBW credential format profile

alongside, for example:

“SD‑JWT‑VC credentials” and “mDoc credentials” as profiles mainly for human/PID contexts.`

This respects your conceptual separation, but reflects how ecosystems, ecosystem adoption, and economic value realization actually work.

9. Process: requirement‑driven architecture and the ADR

Finally, on process:

  • Our earlier “organisational wallet protocol and format discussion” RFC from last year took a structured approach: requirements → options → evaluation → recommendation for organisational wallets.
  • Ronald’s ADR is a continuation of this approach now that EUBW is central in WE BUILD.

Our significant concern is that:

  • If we simply inherit the PID/LPID decision (SD‑JWT‑VC + mDoc) into EUBW without revisiting industrial requirements, we risk locking EUBW into a human‑centric format choice and forcing industrial ecosystems into complex translation layers. If this happens, adoption and large scale economic value realisation will fail.

We therefore suggest the following principles of the ADR:

  1. Semantic model: EUBW SHALL specify W3C VCDM 2.0 + JSON‑LD as the mandatory semantic and structural model for EUBW credentials that represent legal persons, organisations, assets, roles, DPPs and data‑space artefacts.
  2. Proof mechanism for industrial/B2B use cases: EUBW SHALL specify VC Data Integrity proofs as the preferred proof mechanism for these credentials (with ECDSA and BBS+ cryptosuites as the main candidates, and PQC later).
  3. Additional formats: SD‑JWT‑VC and mDoc MAY be supported as additional credential formats where human‑centric use cases justify them (e.g. sole trader use cases such as opening a bank account or interacting with governments), but they SHOULD NOT be the only or primary formats for EUBW legal‑person / B2B credentials.

This approach:

  • Respects the clarification that VCDM is a data model and Data Integrity is a proof framework.
  • Reflects that industrial ecosystems already use VCDM JSON‑LD credentials as their effective credential format.
  • Aligns with ETSI and emerging ISO work on VCDM + Data Integrity + BBS+.
  • Minimises complexity in ZTA and industrial policy engines by keeping one main data model + one main proof family for EUBW’s industrial scope.

This is exactly the thinking behind Ronald’s ADR: use standard engineering practice (requirements, alternatives, evaluation) and then make an informed decision that matches industrial needs, instead of deriving the industrial stack from human browser flows.

Final Thoughts

The conceptual analysis, reflects how ecosystems, ecosystem adoption, and economic value realization actually work.

The RWOT “Cooperation Beats Aggregation” work on identity as a meta‑platform shows that open, shared standards for decentralized identity create network‑of‑networks effects: each additional ecosystem that plugs into the same identity and credential layer increases the total value for all others, not just linearly, but through cross‑terms between networks.

If we let EUBW + EUDI + DPP + data spaces + Industry 4.0 + supply chain + ZTA converge on one coherent stack (VCDM JSON‑LD + Data Integrity), then every new data space, DPP scheme, or industrial network that adopts it does not just “join another platform” – it amplifies all existing ones by lowering onboarding and trust costs across contexts.

A nested, fragmented credential approach works in the opposite direction: it forces each ecosystem to carry the cost of mapping and translation, favours large aggregators who can manage the complexity, and blocks the cooperative network‑of‑networks scaling law that decentralized identity was designed to unlock.

For the EUBW, the macroeconomic opportunity is exactly here: to act as the identity meta‑platform for European industry and data sovereignty, where one technical standard for credentials and proofs lets many independent ecosystems cooperate without surrendering control, and where crypto‑agile Data Integrity proofs give us a clean path through the PQC transition without breaking those network effects.

To close, we should be very clear: Europe needs one coherent technical stack across EUBW, DPPs, data spaces (including EU data sovereignty initiatives), Industry 4.0, supply chains, UNTP, and ZTA, with built‑in crypto agility to handle the PQC transition.

If we fragment this with nested formats and parallel models, we push complexity and cost onto every industrial actor and lose the macro‑economic benefits that a common, reusable credential layer can create. A consistent VCDM + Data Integrity foundation lets industry reuse the same credentials and proofs across wallets, data spaces, digital product passports and Zero Trust control planes, while still allowing cryptosuite upgrades and PQC migration when needed. The EUBW is our chance to align these pieces once, at European scale, instead of forcing each ecosystem to solve the same hard problem in isolation.

Engaging in the ultimate, existential race for Trusted AI

If we get this right, the EUBW can also become the missing trust layer for industrial AI. Industrial AI will only be as good as the data, context and provenance it can rely on.

That means simple and consistent credential formats, strong semantics, A2A protocol integration, Zero Trust principles and robust credential chaining, from registries and data spaces all the way to models and agents.

A coherent EUBW stack based on VCDM JSON‑LD and Data Integrity gives us exactly that: machine‑readable meaning, verifiable origin, and a graph of credentials that AI systems can consume directly for access control, risk evaluation and compliance.

This is a strategic topic. It is one of the few levers (if not the only) Europe must deliver in the race for "trusted industrial AI". By aligning EUBW, DPPs, data spaces, AI, and ZTA on one simple and expressive credential stack now, we give European industry a common trust fabric that AI can build on, and we position Europe strongly in the global race for safe, explainable and regulator‑ready industrial AI.

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Why-Advisory commented Nov 17, 2025

Having had payments and trade finance in my Nordea organisation I have not been able to imagine that EU is not going fully for linkable data with EUBWs.. and DC4EU is all for it..
Should have written an open letter about also this some time ago... as it was not visible in open letters From 22( focusing on all identity building credentials - not only for identication) and this new. one

https://www.finextra.com/blogposting/28792/open-letter-to-the-european-commission-member-states-and-beyond

@carolynnbernier
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EUBW and DPP : open international ecosystems for data sharing.

Sharing data over and across international borders is the fundamental objective of both the Digital Product Passport (DPP) and the EU Business Wallet. This last is a fundamental enabler for the DPP, without which the mandatory capabilities of the DPP system cannot be achieved. Hence it is both logical and fundamental that both be built using similar technology stacks.

The reference to controlled vocabularies providing the necessary context has already been the focus of consensual discussions in the standardisation committee mandated to deliver standards for the European DPP (CEN/CENELEC JTC-24).

Reasons for adopting this approach are provided in the proposed system architecture developed by the CIRPASS project
D3.2 DPP System Architecture
D5.1 DPP Prototypes

The very first recommendation for implementation made by the CIRPASS-2 consortium (see page 32) is to use the JSON-LD serialization format:
D4.1 REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE – May 13, 2025

CIRPASS-2 is actively developing core vocabularies to support this approach:
Ontology Requirements Specification for an EU DPP Core Ontology Proposal – March 12, 2025
The second iteration of the core vocabularies has been published here:
CIRPASS-2 vocabularies

Because of the importance of semantic interoperability in the DPP context, I recorded this youtube tutorial that explains this in simple terms. The arguments are the same for the EU BW.
Tutorial on Semantic Interoperability for Digital Product Passports – July 18, 2025

Carolynn Bernier, CIRPASS-2 project coordinator

The CIRPASS and CIRPASS-2 projects respectively received and receives funding from the European Commission under the DigitalEurope Programme and is directly supervised by DG CONNECT.

@fredriklinden
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Great text, Fix the Typos in "Additional formats: SD‑JWT‑VC and mDoc MAY be supported as additional credential formats where human‑centric use cases justify them (e.g. low-volumen sole traders use cases such as openeing a bank account or government interaction), but they SHOULD NOT be the only or primary formats for EUBW legal‑person / B2B credentials." And also, these are not low-volume use cases in many geographies and should be treated as such.

@rkxx
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rkxx commented Nov 17, 2025

Thank you for the detailed proposal. One clarification may help refine this ADR. W3C VCDM is a semantic data model, not an attestation format. It defines how claims are structured and semantically represented, but it does not prescribe the serialisation format, proof mechanism, signature scheme, or transport. VCDM-based claims can therefore be conveyed within several envelopes, including JWT-VC, SD-JWT-VC, or COSE-based formats.

For this reason, it may be more accurate to frame the ADR as “Specify the Semantic Data Model and Attestation Formats for the EUBW EAA”. This allows a clear comparison of the attestation formats already used in the EUDI ecosystem, such as ISO/IEC mdoc and JSON-based formats like SD-JWT-VC or JWT-VC, while treating the semantic layer, including VCDM, as a separate concern.

This avoids positioning VCDM as a competing format and maintains a clear separation between:

  • the attestation envelope,
  • the proof mechanism, and
  • the semantic data model.

It also preserves flexibility for use-case owners to select suitable combinations without increasing the number of attestation models the wallet must support.

Just let me clarify.

The ADR defines W3C-VCDM as a reference to the credential format specified in 'W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model v2.0' W3C VCDM 2.0. Chapter 3, 'Core Data Model', of this specification describes the conceptual model of credentials and presentations. This model can indeed be implemented in different formats, such as mDoc, SD-JWT-VC or W3C-VCDM. However, the following chapters describe the format of a W3C-VCDM credential:

  • Serialization format: JSON-LD (chapter 6.1)
  • Proof mechanism: enveloping proofs and embedded proofs (chapter 4.12). Please note that W3C-VCDM can be signed using SD-JWT. Therefore, I would like to separate the discussion about proof mechanisms. Just a general remark: SD-JWT-VC must be signed with SD-JWT. W3C-VCDM is much more powerful. It supports a broad range of proof mechanisms including data integrity proofs (ecdsa, ecdsa-sd, bbs, etc.), jose, cose and SD-JWT.
  • Metadata claims: Metadata properties of credentials according to the model (chapter 4.2). Please also refer to the Verifiable Credentials Vocabulary v2.0 for a formal semantic model including mapping.

Transport: The protocols for issuing and presenting credentials should be independent from the credential format. Therefore, I would like to separate this discussion. Just a remark: OID4VCI/OID4VP supports both SD-JWT-VC as well as W3C-VCDM - see OID4VCI 1.0 - Appendix A: Credential Format Profiles.

In summary, the goal of the ADR is not to propose semantic modelling on top of mDoc and SD-JWT-VC. Rather, the goal is to enable the use of the W3C-VCDM credential format, which, in addition to the other reasons explained in the ADR, natively supports linked data and semantic mapping.

@lalc
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lalc commented Nov 17, 2025

Thanks, @cstoecker. Thanks for a good summary of why VCDM plus Data Integrity matters for industrial and B2B ecosystems. I agree that Catena X, Gaia X, UNTP and the data spaces work are critical reference points for the European Business Wallet.

At the same time, I am concerned that we are drifting away from the concrete WE BUILD scope and use cases. I am aligned here with @fredriklinden's comments, but it's not a MAY, it's a SHALL IMHO. From what I see in WE BUILD Consortium WP2 and WP3, and from the EWC experience with age verification and similar flows, WE BUILD needs something concrete:

  • A business wallet that can interface with the EIDAS 2.0 individual wallet, where SD-JWT VC and mDoc are the formats chosen for PID and LPID.
  • Support for the business-oriented use cases we have already identified in WP2 and WP3, which are not only B2B with M2M, but very often business-to-individual exchanges.

From this perspective, I see two key points that need to be addressed:

  • For flows that involve individual data exchange with strong data minimisation requirements, for e.g., in the healthcare data space, we need clarity on how companies are expected to support selective disclosure in practice across both the EUDI Wallet and the Business Wallet. Since 2021, we have been involved in cross-border data exchange between organisations where this has been a non-negotiable requirement, and we can provide concrete project references that illustrate this.
  • We also need to understand why SD JWT is being ruled out on the business side at this stage. Given that SD JWT VC is already part of the EUDI stack, it seems natural that a business wallet solution should be able to support both approaches, that is VCDM and Data Integrity for industrial ecosystems, as well as SD-JWT VC where individual wallets are involved.
  • There seems to be three usecase blocks supporting multiple data exchange patterns: B2C, B2B/B2G (non-M2M), B2B (M2M)

As a WE BUILD Consortium member, the starting point for WE BUILD should be:

  • Define a Business Wallet profile that is protocol and format-agile, rather than bound to a single attestation format.
  • Ensure that any conformant Business Wallet can support SD-JWT-based interactions with an individual EUDI Wallet, while also supporting VCDM JSON-LD and Data Integrity with data spaces, DPP infrastructures, and other B2B environments.

In other words, I fully agree that VCDM JSON LD plus Data Integrity is a strong candidate for the industrial “orange ocean”. However, from a WE BUILD architecture point of view, I would prefer that our ADR:

  • Treats VCDM JSON LD plus Data Integrity as a preferred profile for industrial and B2B scope, and
  • Explicitly recognises SD-JWT VC as a format that Business Wallets MUST be able to interface with when EUDI Wallets and PID/LPID are in the loop, so that we do not bake in a decision that excludes SD-JWT from organisational use cases.

Otherwise, we risk designing a Business Wallet that is optimised for industrial pilots but is hard to plug into the EIDAS 2.0 individual wallet stack and the concrete WE BUILD use cases that depend on it.

@rkxx
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rkxx commented Nov 17, 2025

Thanks, @cstoecker. Thanks for a good summary of why VCDM plus Data Integrity matters for industrial and B2B ecosystems. I agree that Catena X, Gaia X, UNTP and the data spaces work are critical reference points for the European Business Wallet.

At the same time, I am concerned that we are drifting away from the concrete WE BUILD scope and use cases. I am aligned here with @fredriklinden's comments, but it's not a MAY, it's a SHALL IMHO. From what I see in WE BUILD Consortium WP2 and WP3, and from the EWC experience with age verification and similar flows, WE BUILD needs something concrete:

  • A business wallet that can interface with the EIDAS 2.0 individual wallet, where SD-JWT VC and mDoc are the formats chosen for PID and LPID.
  • Support for the business-oriented use cases we have already identified in WP2 and WP3, which are not only B2B with M2M, but very often business-to-individual exchanges.

From this perspective, I see two key points that need to be addressed:

  • For flows that involve individual data exchange with strong data minimisation requirements, for e.g., in the healthcare data space, we need clarity on how companies are expected to support selective disclosure in practice across both the EUDI Wallet and the Business Wallet. Since 2021, we have been involved in cross-border data exchange between organisations where this has been a non-negotiable requirement, and we can provide concrete project references that illustrate this.
  • We also need to understand why SD JWT is being ruled out on the business side at this stage. Given that SD JWT VC is already part of the EUDI stack, it seems natural that a business wallet solution should be able to support both approaches, that is VCDM and Data Integrity for industrial ecosystems, as well as SD-JWT VC where individual wallets are involved.
  • There seems to be three usecase blocks supporting multiple data exchange patterns: B2C, B2B/B2G (non-M2M), B2B (M2M)

As a WE BUILD Consortium member, the starting point for WE BUILD should be:

  • Define a Business Wallet profile that is protocol and format-agile, rather than bound to a single attestation format.
  • Ensure that any conformant Business Wallet can support SD-JWT-based interactions with an individual EUDI Wallet, while also supporting VCDM JSON-LD and Data Integrity with data spaces, DPP infrastructures, and other B2B environments.

In other words, I fully agree that VCDM JSON LD plus Data Integrity is a strong candidate for the industrial “orange ocean”. However, from a WE BUILD architecture point of view, I would prefer that our ADR:

  • Treats VCDM JSON LD plus Data Integrity as a preferred profile for industrial and B2B scope, and
  • Explicitly recognises SD-JWT VC as a format that Business Wallets MUST be able to interface with when EUDI Wallets and PID/LPID are in the loop, so that we do not bake in a decision that excludes SD-JWT from organisational use cases.

Otherwise, we risk designing a Business Wallet that is optimised for industrial pilots but is hard to plug into the EIDAS 2.0 individual wallet stack and the concrete WE BUILD use cases that depend on it.

@lalc, I just want to be sure I've got you right: According to the ADR's proposed decisions, no changes are needed.

  1. A business wallet is mainly used for business-to-business (B2B), business-to-government (B2G) and industrial purposes. So, W3C-VCDM is the preferred credential format for EUBW. This is recorded in decision 1.
  2. We should not ignore mDoc and SD-JWT-SD. This is guaranteed by decision 2. The person responsible for the use case chooses the credential format (mDoc, SD-JWT-SD or W3C-VCDM) based on their use case's specific needs.

Finally, W3C-VCDM works with SD-JWT. You can also use ECDSA-SD and BBS. So, selective disclosure and data minimisation isn't a problem.

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Why-Advisory commented Nov 17, 2025 via email

@cstoecker
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cstoecker commented Nov 17, 2025

Introduction to Citizen vs Employee Identity

When an EUBW interacts with a Citizen Wallet, the use of EUDIW formats is given (PID/LPID with mDoc and SD‑JWT‑VC). This covers B2C e‑commerce and similar flows. There is no dispute here. No additional work is needed now, except integration work later when the solutions are mature and the timing is right. Integrating too early would create unnecessary friction.

The situation is different when an EUBW interacts with an Employee Wallet in end‑to‑end (E2E) use cases. Employee wallets are not analysed at all in the EWC / WE BUILD work so far, although they will be central for many WE BUILD scenarios (e.g. delegated authority, field staff, operators of critical systems). New employees may be onboarded using their Citizen Wallet, but the day‑to‑day B2B workflows then run in an employment context with very different requirements.

In this insights paper “Verifiable Credentials in ‘Private Individual’ vs ‘Employee’ Contexts (X2I vs X2E)” we show that these two contexts follow different rules. X = Government or Business.

In the citizen (X2I) (we use the term private individuals in the paper instead of citizens, because the wallet should also cater for non‑citizens) case, the wallet is personal, the person acts in a private role, and privacy expectations are strict: data minimisation, low tracking, consent is voluntary, and the main goal is user autonomy.

In the employee (X2E) case, the wallet is part of the employer’s operational environment: the person acts on behalf of an organisation, credentials encode roles and responsibilities, and some logging and “phoning home” is often required for safety, compliance, audit trails and ZTA. Consent is less symmetric, labour law and internal policy play a strong role, and the organisation must be able to enforce policies (e.g. revocation, rotation of roles, shift logging). Mixing these two patterns into one undifferentiated “natural person wallet” leads to governance and adoption problems, as the Vienna election case in the paper already illustrates. Ausweis nicht vergessen: Die Wien-Wahl bleibt analog.

In WE BUILD we should therefore not by default assume that the same architectural choices that work for a Citizen Wallet will also work for an Employee Wallet. The regulatory picture for employee wallets is still unclear: we are between eIDAS/EUDIW on one side and labour law, health and safety, works councils, and sector rules as well as EUBW on the other. This regulatory gap makes it even more important to analyse requirements first before we lock in any technical decisions.

B2B, M2M, A2A Consensus

It is encouraging that there seems to be early consensus to use W3C VCDM with JSON‑LD for B2B, M2M and A2A use cases in WE BUILD. This is a strong basis for EUBW ↔ EUBW and EUBW ↔ data‑space / AI Agent interactions . It also gives us a natural candidate stack for Employee Wallets in an organisational context, because role‑based credentials, delegation chains and ZTA policy decisions need graph‑based semantics and credential chaining.

Proposed methodology for WE BUILD

Based on this, I would like to make the following proposal for next steps:

  1. Analyse employee‑wallet requirements and alternatives.

    • Document concrete E2E flows where an Employee Wallet is involved (e.g. managing directors, first responders, control‑room operators, drivers, field technicians, regulated professionals).
    • Derive functional and non‑functional requirements: device ownership, logging, consent, attribution, revocation, ZTA integration, HR/IAM integration, labour‑law constraints.
    • Evaluate implementation options: EUBW‑centric employee wallets, separate Employee Wallets under employer control, cloud‑hosted enterprise wallets, use of citicen wallets, and their impact on privacy, auditability, compliance, security and interoperability.
  2. Decouple citizen and business parts in end‑to‑end flows.

    • For flows that start with a Citizen Wallet and continue in B2B processes, split the work into two streams:
      – one workstream for B2C flows where the Citizen Wallet and EUDIW formats are in scope,
      – one workstream for the B2B / EUBW / Employee‑Wallet part of the process.
    • Define clear hand‑over points between the two worlds (e.g. “citizen becomes employee / contractor of organisation X, with these attributes transferred under new terms of use”).
    • This reduces dependencies: we can solve the citizen‑wallet interoperability questions and the organisational‑wallet questions in parallel, instead of entangling all problems and slowing down progress.
  3. Run a focused pilot on Business‑to‑Employee (B2E) interactions.

    • Select one or two realistic WE BUILD use cases where an Employee Wallet is critical (for example, a director, an operator of a critical asset, staff or event virtual staff - AI Agents - acting under strict AML / PoA / sector compliance rules).
    • Implement at least two alternative designs (e.g. “Citizen Wallet reused for employment” using SD-JWT or mDoc vs “dedicated Employee Wallet / EUBW solution”) using VCDM JSON‑LD credentials and existing EUDIW formats where needed.
    • Measure usability, security, governance and integration complexity, and use these findings as input for future ADRs.

I believe this would help WE BUILD in three ways:

  • It derisks dependencies between the EUDIW (citizen) stack and the EUBW / Employee‑Wallet stack.
  • It keeps the current ADR on B2B/M2M/A2A credentials on track, while opening a structured space to address employee‑wallet issues instead of ignoring them.
  • It gives us evidence from a B2E pilot before we make long‑term architectural commitments for Employee Wallets at EU level.

I would welcome feedback on this proposal and support from other partners to start a dedicated workstream on Employee Wallet requirements and B2E pilots inside WE BUILD.

@Why-Advisory
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First history: BankID started as identification credential for employees sending corporate loan applications to insurance company net services in Finland in 1992. When Internet came these needs multiplied. One example was for teachers identifiying themselves when giving grades.

This lead to somewhat political debate about how right it is to force employees to use a personal BankID at work. My counterargument was that they already use their personal passports, drivers licences and skill credentials at work. So it became an existing practise to use BankID also as a de-facto signing-on-behalf-of-employer tool.

Now I agree with cstoecker that there is a need to analyse how the situation is changing for natural (privacy risks) and also virtual employees. This also links to ongoing LPID/LEI/vLei discussions.

The backdrop is the "human right" for pre-employees to get all the credentials they need to their wallets for job applications and the duty for employers to have EUBWs to receive them - and use them to "upgrade" CVs. Also get clarity as to how business registers' role as to general power to act must be available in real time - completed with task-specific PoAs.

@samuelmr
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There seems to be a consensus in this discussion that WE BUILD should embrace both W3C VC DM and SD-JWT VC as credential formats. (In addition, mDocs need to be supported by wallets for natural person PIDs.)

Luckily, there already exists an interoperability profile that encompasses both formats. The Decentralized Identity Interop Profile (DIIP) requires compliant implementations to support both SD-JWT VC and W3C VC DM credential formats. In addition, it defines signature schemes for both formats, only one signature algorithm (ES256), only two DID methods for identification (did:web and did:jwk), OID4VC protocols, and only one revocation mechanism (IETF Token Status List, aligned with the HAIP profile).

DIIP makes some choices within the OID4VC protocols – requiring support for only the most essential features. Its goal is to be as simple as possible for real-life use cases, but not simpler.

The DIIP conformance test suite has been implemented using the same Interoperability Test Bed that the WE BUILD consortium is using (and that the EWC pilot used). It is maintained by the same people (especially @endimion).

DIIP is the EUDI-aligned profile you can use right now.

It would make things simpler for everyone if WE BUILD just stated that the consortium uses the DIIP as the interoperability profile. If there is something that needs to be changed in DIIP, suggestions can be made in the DIIPv5 proposal and feedback discussion. The publication date of the DIIP version 5 is January 15, 2026.

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All for the easier DIIP-path

@samuelmr
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Thank you for the detailed proposal. One clarification may help refine this ADR. W3C VCDM is a semantic data model, not an attestation format. It defines how claims are structured and semantically represented, but it does not prescribe the serialisation format, proof mechanism, signature scheme, or transport. VCDM-based claims can therefore be conveyed within several envelopes, including JWT-VC, SD-JWT-VC, or COSE-based formats.

Personally, I had hopes that one could combine the W3C VC Data Model (for semantic description of rich structures) and SD-JWT VC (for signing the credentials with simple selective disclosure and alignment with simple JWT-based "authentication" use cases). The SD-JWT VC DM proposal was an attempt to combine the worlds.

However, the W3C has opted to define a separate way of using SD-JWT: https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-jose-cose/#with-sd-jwt
The SD-JWT VC specification explicitly states:

Note: This specification does not utilize the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model v1.0, v1.1, or v2.0.

(See the end of section 1.2.)

The SD-JWT VC DM proposal has been abandoned. Some of the ideas were adopted to the SD-JWT VC spec, but not the W3C VC DM.

Thus, in my opinion, it doesn't seem a best practice to separate the credential format and the proof mechanism as separate things you can pick-and-choose or mix-and-match. I see the temptation, but the devil is in the details of implementation. See FIDEScommunity/DIIP#67 as an example.

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All too technical for me, but I like the IHE way of testing. I do like the *Global ** EU ***National for each InteropSpec way-of-working. Having said this I also want to say I hate #InformationBlocking and we MUST not end up in that situation where the National and EU ITB diverge into oblivion. .....or the VLOP eg. https://fides.community/community-tools/personal-wallets/ or even SAP-Value-Networks or the like win the Specifications and Standards race based on unethical sponsoring of initiatives. A Use case/REQ from me as an employee could be to bring with me my Certificate of X (eg. Project mgt/Architecture education in method Y) when I leave my employer. It may come from either an internal or external certifier. It is in my EUBW and/or EUDI-wallet.

When it comes to Ontologies (and Data models) I usually just reference ISO21838 and it is not yet part of the Rollingplan on ICT standardisation so no luck there yet in getting guidance. I am a fan of DLT (and EBSI) so anything moving us away from pure PKI/BankID is usually a positive.

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Why-Advisory commented Nov 19, 2025 via email

@flo0x
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flo0x commented Nov 21, 2025

I agree with @lalc comments — it is drifting away from the concrete WE BUILD scope and defined use cases.
In my opinion, it is beneficial to “Specify the Semantic Data Model and Attestation Formats for the EUBW EAA in the product domains”, ensuring consistency across domains and products.
I do not agree with @rkxx proposal that "use cases should choose their own credential formats" as this would fragment the ecosystem.

Here are reasons:
Reason 1 — Human-Triggered Processes Dominate B2B/B2G
Most processes are still initiated by a natural person acting on behalf of the legal entity, including: Supplier onboarding, Customer registration, KYC/KYB, Contract signing, Approvals

This has implications for legal entity data:
a. Legal Entity–Core Identity which has the purpose to prove the existence and core identity of the legal entity.
Examples: Legal name, registration number, VAT, LEI, country of incorporation.
This should be an immutable anchor for cross-border identification and trust.

b. Legal Entity Organisation–Specific Data — Governance & Authority which has the purpose to define who is authorised to act on behalf of the entity.
Examples: Mandates, powers of attorney, UBO data, representation rights, organisational structure.
This enables combined identification + authorisation in a single step.

That’s why:
• Business Wallets must interoperate seamlessly with the EUDI Individual Wallet.
• LPID must rely on aligned formats SD-JWT VC
• Mandates/PoA/representation rights must be standardised alongside LPID/EUCC.

If this is not achieved, SMEs cannot maintain multiple identity formats for identification and authorisation.
Important: The requirements for RP to identify persons (e.g., via PID) according to different regulations are for the RP, not for the holder.

Reason 2 — Legal Entity Process–Specific Data (Operations & Compliance) has the purpose to support operational, financial, and regulatory processes.
Examples: Invoicing, tax data, IBAN, KYB/KYS results, onboarding data.
Important here:
• The requirements for RP to identify persons according to different regulations are for the RP, not the holder.
• Allowing the use-case owner to define the format will block many MVPs in WE BUILD.
That’s why:
• Must use the same attestation format as blocks 1 and 2
○ Allows combined requests (e.g., identity + mandate + domain-specific KYB)
○ Essential for sequential flows such as identification → onboarding

Practical Example: A typical cross-border KYB between two partners requires 7–8 organisations:
• 3 per party (legal entity, wallet provider, authentic source provider)
• 1–2 QTSPs for signing/sealing regulatory documents
Risk: If each organisation chooses its own format, workflows become impossible, especially for SMEs.

Reason 3 — Modular Scenario Design in WE BUILD
WE BUILD must use a modular design to enable MVPs ( block definition see BU1 and PA3) -> if each organisation chooses its own format will not reach even the medium scenarios.

Practical Example: A basic procurement + invoicing + payment flow involves over 20 organisations across 4 scenarios.
Afterwards, SMEs cannot navigate multiple incompatible formats for essentially the same data.

Reason 4 — Legal Entity Product/Data (Domain-Specific) this covers product-level or sector-specific compliance information.
Examples: DPP, CE declarations, conformity documents, product specs, lifecycle attestations
Normally:
- Typically is issued by the entity itself, optionally signed by a QTSP
○ Best served by semantic-rich formats like W3C-VCDM
○ Should remain separate from foundational identity layers (Blocks 1–3) to avoid overloading core credentials

My Recommendation
• Blocks 1–3 (identity, organisation, process): Must use aligned formats (mDoc + SD-JWT VC)
• Block 4 (product/domain): MAY use semantic-rich formats (W3C-VCDM)
• Use cases must not select their own formats to ensure interoperability, scalability, and SME-friendly adoption

@Why-Advisory
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I think this must be looked into now " cstoecker: "In the citizen (X2I) (we use the term private individuals in the paper instead of citizens, because the wallet should also cater for non‑citizens) case, the wallet is personal, the person acts in a private role, and privacy expectations are strict: data minimisation, low tracking, consent is voluntary, and the main goal is user autonomy.

In the employee (X2E) case, the wallet is part of the employer’s operational environment: the person acts on behalf of an organisation, credentials encode roles and responsibilities, and some logging and “phoning home” is often required for safety, compliance, audit trails and ZTA. Consent is less symmetric, labour law and internal policy play a strong role, and the organisation must be able to enforce policies (e.g. revocation, rotation of roles, shift logging). Mixing these two patterns into one undifferentiated “natural person wallet” leads to governance and adoption problems, as the Vienna election case in the paper already illustrates. Ausweis nicht vergessen: Die Wien-Wahl bleibt analog."

@carolynnbernier
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The Vienna election case is really interesting. If I understand correctly what happened, election volunteers did not want to use their own personal wallets to verify the identity of voters. Perhaps they did not trust that this would not leave any "trace". So the Austrian government would need to create "election volunteer" credentials (using either the volunteeer's paper ID or eID) for volunteers and an "election volunteer" wallet (=EBW) app.

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We should find time to sketch the why and how for b2e. As said before work use of personal tools - as own e-ID - is established practise here.

@DominicHurni
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Thanks for all your explanations and inputs.

As representative of railway industry, I like to share with you our business needs regarding product data exchange:
Automated exchange of verifiable product data along products life cycle in a machine readable form.

This statement bases on regulatory requirements with impact on credential format.

new Construction Product Regulation (CPR)

  • Article 77 (d): "all information included in the digital product passport shall be based on open standards, developed with an interoperable format and shall, as appropriate, be machine-readable, structured, searchable and transferable through an open interoperable data exchange network, without ‘vendor lock-in’,...".
    => credentials need a machine - readable structure to achieve automation, based on defined vocabulary/semantic/ontology. Additionally credential format follows open standards without vender locking for more international user acceptance and scaling.

  • Annex II Predetermined environment essential characteristics (e.g. climate change effects, acidification potential,...)
    => These credentials need to be verifiable regarding issuers, defined product group and used calculation method , based on common vocabulary/semantic/ontology. Verifiable credentials are mandatory when it comes to sustainable data to avoid greenwashing in procurement processes.

Ecodesign for Sustainable Product Regulation (ESPR)

  • Article 11 (b) customers, manufacturers, importers, distributors, dealers, professional repairers, independent operators, refurbishers, remanufacturers, recyclers, market surveillance authorities and customs authorities, civil society organisations, trade unions and other relevant actors shall have free of charge and easy access to the digital product passport based on their respective access rights set out in the applicable delegated act adopted pursuant to Article 4
    => Credentials need selective disclosure function to fullfil data needs of various consumers.

  • Article 11 (d) where a new digital product passport is created for a product that already has a digital product passport, the new digital product passport shall be linked to the original digital product passport or passports.
    => Credentials allow linkablel data.

Proposal of European Business Wallet Regulation :
The Digital Product Passport (DPP), central to the EU’s circular economy agenda, depends on trusted access to conformity and sustainability data. The Business Wallets can prove legal identity and any granted access rights, allow conformity declarations to be signed and sealed, and ensure product data is exchanged securely and verifiably across borders
=> European Business Wallet shall ensure product data is exchanged securely and verifiably across borders.

Conclusion
To fulfil our need of automated exchange of verifiable product data along products life cycle in a machine readable form we use European Business Wallet using open standards, common vocabularies/semantic/ontology without vender lock-in. European Business Wallet has to focus beyond Identity to scale internationally.

WE support ARD regarding W3C-VCDM that covers mentioned requirements. Please add W3C-VCDM to the list of available credential formats within We Build and let's test W3C-VCDM in use cases.

@Why-Advisory
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W3C-VCDM for sure needed for industry and global trade - and EUs role there

@leifj
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leifj commented Nov 28, 2025

I think it is premature to identify a "winner". I don't have a problem including the vc2.0 model into the list of "should implement" but given the current state of play of zkp it is definitely premature to be absolutely sure about what will work and not.

Somebody on this thread made the claim that dc4eu supports vc2.0. This is not strictly true. There were some parties in dc4eu who bet heavily on vc2.0 but certainly not everyone. If you look to the practical deployments related to higher education infra it is certainly not using vc2.0 at this point.

I have several problems with vc2.0 as an implementer:

  1. The complexity of the data model. Having implemented it and working on interfacing with the w3c conformance suite I can personally attest to who many things can go wrong.
  2. The complexity and lack of clarity around canonicalization of json-ld is imo dangerous especially given our experience with xml canonicalization (which is arguably easier to implement correctly) has led to numerous serious security issues over the years.

I do not want to dissuade from adopting vc2.0 as one of the data models - certainly not for a demo, poc or experiment - but to classify it as the main solution is imo irresponsable at this time.

@Why-Advisory
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I do not think we should declare a "winner" but see to it that the needs of enterprises and global trade are supported. EU competitiveness is so important. Is ZKP problematic in b2b and g2b/b2g? How absolutely sure can one be in any case?

@leifj
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leifj commented Nov 28, 2025

Yes zkp will be used both in b2b and b2g cases.

I am not arguing for excluding vc2.0 but I am arguing against an ADR that sais that vc2.0 is the primary format for the EUBW.

@flo0x
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flo0x commented Nov 28, 2025

Hi @DominicHurni I fully agree that product information and other relevant data need to be verifiable (also EUBW Proposal specify - "DPP product data will be exchanged securely and verifiably across borders")
However, is necessary to store product information in the EU Business Wallet and mix product attestation with Organisation identity information!!!
It is not better to let the EUBW focus on establishing trust/accountability and remain dedicated to identity, organizational and legal compliance credentials -> in this way we have more flexibility.
This topics are used by all companies in the EU:
1.B2G: Solve the mutual authentication with public authorities + presenting business attestation (TAX, VAT, etc.)
2.B2B: Solve the mutual authentication with Business Partners and make business (buy,sell, exchange info, payment ...)

Only 25% of companies in EU deals with product and other data exchanges directly or indirectly.
For these cases, we can use W3C-VCDM which is better suited for exchanging product data and structured information. These formats can be applied to: DPP, PPWR, Critical raw materials, DeclarationOfConformity, etc

For example: if a company produces products and need to attest the instance need 10K-100K attestation to store and linked to others (DoC, PPWR)... It is unrealistic to expect that this volume of product-related data would be stored in the EuBW.

In short: the EuBW should remain focused on identity, organization and legal compliance.
The product-level attestations can be stored in another wallet and use the EUBW for identification/legal perspective

@Why-Advisory
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We should lean on Carsten Stoecker's knowhow:

"Now it takes courage and the unconditional entrepreneurial will for the global battle for Trusted Industrial AI. We are there. Who will go along with it?

Industrial AI can only succeed with unconditional will, world-class teams, a high use of resources and interdisciplinary work. In the global competition for AI-powered cyber-physical systems, we have so far seen only a few companies in Europe that have all of this.

If we lose this battle – including Science AI – Industry 4.0 will be ready for a museum.

The marathon triple jump is decisive:

Industrial AI → Trusted Industrial AI → real value creation.

Trusted AI means: traceable models, robust data, audited processes, clear identities, verifiable digital powers of attorney for AI agents, auditability and liability capability. The Industrial AI Use Case incl.

AI Functional Safety,
AI Security &
AI compliance truly scalable.

The Trust Layer is not an optional extra, but an absolutely necessary prerequisite for operating license, certification and value creation in industrial infrastructures.

This is exactly where Europe has a head start: eIDAS 2.0 and the European Business Wallet create a legally anchored trust layer for Industrial AI. "

@samuelmr
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In short: the EuBW should remain focused on identity, organization and legal compliance.
The product-level attestations can be stored in another wallet and use the EUBW for identification/legal perspective

In your previous comment, you were worried that the ecosystem would get fragmented if multiple credential formats had to be supported.

Having one credential store (business wallet) for identity/compliance credentials and another for product-related credentials is much more harmful fragmentation than a wallet supporting many credential formats. It would be akin to using different browsers for PNGs and SVGs. (There are reasons why there are various formats for presenting images online. There are also reasons why different use cases need different credential formats. Implementing support for multiple formats is an additional effort for software vendors. For users, it means that the format best suited for a task can be used.)

@flo0x
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flo0x commented Nov 29, 2025

@samuelmr The EuBW first requires a mutual authentication between actors, which is a fundamentally different for a tool rendering. Mutual authentication depends on strong, uniform trust anchors and not on format diversity. Otherwise, we could simply fall back to signed PDFs.

The EUBW is for identity, trust and authentication, not for handling of product data, sustainability records...

In your previous comment, you were worried that the ecosystem would get fragmented if multiple credential formats had to be supported.

Yes, in both cases we have a fragmentation - the question is which type of fragmentation has the lowest impact while still offering flexibility and support for scalability.
Option 1: EUBW to support multiple credential formats
– fragments identification, verification, revocation and liability models at the identity layer. The cross-border trust and interoperability will be also affected.

Option 2: Keep the EuBW as identity layer and allow flexibility at the product/sector level
– Fragmentation is limited to the boundary between identity and product domains, where it is manageable.
– high-assurance identity, authentication and signature can be used and interoperable EU-wide.

For users, it means that the format best suited for a task can be used.

I’m not sure I fully understand this point. Are you referring here to the format for non-identity data?

@michelleludovici-ai
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I am late to the conversation it seems, but i can add some small perspective from the PID/EBWOID (European Business Wallet Owner Identification Data) group. I would agree with Lal's comment earlier that we within WeBuild primarily serve the use-cases identified within WeBuild. Those use-cases who explicitly ask for the JSON-LD format should describe their needs here and then we can supply f.ex. a in that format. We will though start with SD-JWT since the PID/LPID group has - up to now - not heard from the official use-cases within WeBuild about needing JSON-LD, but a lot about wanting to test SD-JWTs and a some few voices about mDoc.

@Saramandus Saramandus linked an issue Jan 14, 2026 that may be closed by this pull request
@sander
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sander commented Feb 2, 2026

In general I agree with the feedback by with @michelleludovici-ai, @leifj, @lalc.

To move forward towards a use case-based decision for WE BUILD (not EBW in general): we now have a list of required attestations. Do these include any that require W3C VCDM 2.0? And for these, does SD-JWT VC suffice as a VCDM implementation, or are there requirements that can only be solved using JSON LD?

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Credential format for EUBW