Add SLH-DSA support for the TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 handshake by Frauschi · Pull Request #10901 · wolfSSL/wolfssl

Frauschi · 2026-07-14T17:57:26Z

Summary

Adds SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+, FIPS 205) as an entity authentication algorithm for the TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 handshake, following draft-reddy-tls-slhdsa. An SLH-DSA leaf key can now be used to sign (and a peer's SLH-DSA leaf to verify) the CertificateVerify message, for both server and mutual authentication.

All twelve parameter sets are wired into the handshake — the SHAKE and SHA2 hash families across 128/192/256 in both the f (fast) and s (small) variants — with per-parameter-set gating so a build only offers, accepts, and maps the variants actually compiled in. Test certificates and configs cover the 128f and 128s sets for both hash families.

Motivation

SLH-DSA is a stateless hash-based signature scheme standardized in FIPS 205. Its appeal is a conservative security foundation (hash functions only), but its signatures are large — from ~7.8 KB (128s) up to ~49 KB (256f) — which stresses several fixed-size buffers in the TLS/cert code that were sized for classical signatures. This PR adds the protocol support and the buffer-sizing work needed to make it viable, including on memory-constrained targets.

What's included

Handshake integration

Map the SLH-DSA signature schemes to/from the wire in the signature_algorithms extension and CertificateVerify.
Sign/verify CertificateVerify with an SLH-DSA entity key.
Load SLH-DSA private keys and certificates and resolve their key/param types (ssl_load.c, ssl.c, ssl_api_pk.c, asn.c, wc_slhdsa.h).
Advertisement, mapping, and OID handling are gated per parameter set, so partial builds (e.g. --enable-slhdsa=sha2-128s) never advertise or map a variant they cannot perform.

Streamed CertificateVerify send (large signatures)

When the CertificateVerify body exceeds a single record, the signature is generated once into a connection-level buffer and emitted one record at a time, so the output buffer never has to hold the whole signature.

Resumes correctly across a non-blocking WANT_WRITE without recomputing the randomized signature (the already-sent records are bound into the transcript, so the resumed send must emit the identical bytes — this is a correctness requirement, not an optimization).
Gated by WOLFSSL_TLS13_STREAM_CERT_VERIFY (TLS 1.3, non-async, PQC signatures). It is algorithm-neutral — it also applies to ML-DSA (or any scheme) whenever the body exceeds the negotiated max_fragment_length.
DTLS 1.3 and WOLFSSL_ASYNC_CRYPT builds keep the existing in-place fragmented path (see Scope / carve-outs).
Dual-algorithm (WOLFSSL_DUAL_ALG_CERTS, BOTH) bodies stream as well: the combined two-signature body is sized from per-signature upper bounds and the exact length is recorded after signing (trailing slack is never sent).

Peak send-side memory is ≈ one signature + one record (the record is at most 16 KB, or the negotiated max_fragment_length if smaller), versus the ~2× a naive in-place send holds (the assembled body plus a copy). The reduction is largest exactly where it matters for constrained devices — a small max_fragment_length, where the second term is sub-KB and the peak is essentially the signature itself. It also stops the output buffer from staying inflated to the whole signature for the connection's lifetime.

Buffer sizing

MAX_X509_SIZE is now parameter-aware for post-quantum certificates, sized from the largest enabled SLH-DSA/ML-DSA signature. The previous flat 8 KB could not hold an SLH-DSA-signed certificate (~8.5 KB), which silently broke the static session-certificate cache paths.
The CertificateVerify and PreTBS buffers are sized from the actual signature length instead of the worst-case WC_MAX_CERT_VERIFY_SZ (which balloons to ~50 KB with SLH-DSA). WC_MAX_CERT_VERIFY_SZ is retained for API/backward compatibility and documented as no longer used internally.

Tests and certificates

SLH-DSA entity (client/server) certificates for the SHAKE and SHA2 128f/128s parameter sets, plus generation-script updates.
TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 entity-cert CertificateVerify test configs covering the fragmented (128f) and single-record (128s) send paths for both hash families, wired into suites.c (server-auth + mutual-auth scenarios).

Enabling

./configure --enable-slhdsa            # all parameter sets (SHAKE)
./configure --enable-slhdsa=sha2       # SHA2 family
./configure --enable-slhdsa=128s,128f  # specific parameter sets

TLS 1.3 is required (enabled by default). The SHA2 family additionally requires SHA-256, SHA-512, and HMAC.

Scope / carve-outs

DTLS 1.3 is intentionally not on the streaming path. DTLS fragments at the handshake layer (offset/length) via Dtls13HandshakeSend, and its reliability model must retain the full message for retransmission until ACKed — so streaming yields no memory benefit there. A code comment in Dtls13SendFragmented records the follow-up (sign directly into the fragments buffer to avoid the transient second copy; the retransmit copy is a hard floor).
WOLFSSL_ASYNC_CRYPT builds keep the existing in-place fragmented path. Async introduces a record-AEAD WC_PENDING_E resume point whose cursor-timing requirement conflicts with the non-blocking WANT_WRITE cursor; the in-place path already handles both correctly. Async targets (HW-offload servers) are not memory-constrained, so there is no beneficiary for the added complexity.

Testing

Full ./tests/unit.test suite: pass (normal handshakes + all SLH-DSA configs + DTLS + crypto API tests).
Streamed path (128f, server + mutual auth): pass.
Single-record path (128s) and DTLS 1.3 in-place path: pass.
Full library build with -Werror: clean; verified the streaming feature-macro
off path (classical/async builds) also compiles clean.

Known limitations / follow-ups

Test coverage exercises the 128f/128s fragmentation boundaries; the 192f/256f parameter sets (deepest fragmentation, up to ~49 KB) are not yet covered at the TLS layer. Adding a 192f/256f entity config (guarded on the corresponding WOLFSSL_SLHDSA_PARAM_* macros) would strengthen the streaming/fragmentation coverage.
The streamed dual-algorithm (WOLFSSL_DUAL_ALG_CERTS, BOTH) path with a fragment-sized signature is not covered by a test config (no dual-alg SLH-DSA test certificates exist); it is correct by construction but unexercised.
Dual-alg alt-signature verification now uses a tight computed PreTBS bound rather than a fixed size; a regression test for a valid dual-alg certificate with a large alternative signature would be good hygiene.
DTLS memory reduction (sign into the fragments buffer) is noted in-code as a possible future optimization.

github-actions · 2026-07-14T18:13:15Z

MemBrowse Memory Report

gcc-arm-cortex-m3

FLASH: .text -8 B (-0.0%, 122,497 B / 262,144 B, total: 47% used)

gcc-arm-cortex-m4-dtls13

FLASH: .text +320 B (+0.2%, 181,272 B / 1,048,576 B, total: 17% used)

gcc-arm-cortex-m4-openssl-compat

FLASH: .text +576 B (+0.1%, 772,132 B / 1,048,576 B, total: 74% used)

gcc-arm-cortex-m4-pq

FLASH: .text +768 B (+0.3%, 280,568 B / 1,048,576 B, total: 27% used)

gcc-arm-cortex-m4-rsa-only

FLASH: .text +384 B (+0.1%, 325,784 B / 1,048,576 B, total: 31% used)

gcc-arm-cortex-m4-tls13

FLASH: .text +320 B (+0.1%, 236,800 B / 262,144 B, total: 90% used)

gcc-arm-cortex-m7-pq

FLASH: .text +768 B (+0.3%, 281,144 B / 1,048,576 B, total: 27% used)

gcc-arm-cortex-m7-tls13

FLASH: .text +384 B (+0.2%, 236,864 B / 262,144 B, total: 90% used)

linuxkm-standard

Data: __patchable_function_entries +8 B (+0.0%, 48,256 B)
No memory changes detected for:
gcc-arm-cortex-m0plus
gcc-arm-cortex-m4
gcc-arm-cortex-m4-baremetal
gcc-arm-cortex-m4-crypto-only
gcc-arm-cortex-m4-min-ecc
gcc-arm-cortex-m4-pkcs7
gcc-arm-cortex-m4-sp-math
gcc-arm-cortex-m4-tls12
gcc-arm-cortex-m7
linuxkm-pie
stm32-sim-stm32h753

Frauschi · 2026-07-15T06:06:30Z

Jenkins retest this please

wolfSSL-Fenrir-bot

Fenrir Automated Review — PR #10901

Scan targets checked: wolfcrypt-bugs, wolfcrypt-port-bugs, wolfcrypt-rs-bugs, wolfcrypt-src, wolfssl-bugs, wolfssl-src

Findings: 1
1 finding(s) posted as inline comments (see file-level comments below)

This review was generated automatically by Fenrir. Findings are non-blocking.

wolfSSL-Fenrir-bot

Fenrir Automated Review — PR #10901

Scan targets checked: wolfcrypt-bugs, wolfcrypt-port-bugs, wolfcrypt-rs-bugs, wolfcrypt-src, wolfssl-bugs, wolfssl-src
Findings: 3
2 finding(s) posted as inline comments (see file-level comments below)

Info (1)

SHAKE-variant SLH-DSA cases in EncodeSigAlg lack per-parameter-set guards

Function: EncodeSigAlg
Category: Code Consistency / Defensive Programming

The SHA2-family SLH-DSA cases in EncodeSigAlg are individually gated (e.g. #ifdef WOLFSSL_SLHDSA_PARAM_SHA2_128S) whereas the SHAKE-family cases fall through under the single #ifdef WOLFSSL_HAVE_SLHDSA umbrella. This is an internal inconsistency: if WOLFSSL_HAVE_SLHDSA is defined but a specific SHAKE parameter set (e.g. WOLFSSL_SLHDSA_PARAM_128F) is not, the corresponding case statement is still compiled in even though it can never be reached. AddSuiteHashSigAlgo, which feeds the negotiated suite, is correctly per-variant gated, so the enum value would never appear in args->sigAlgo. Because AddSuiteHashSigAlgo, SlhDsaSigMinorToType, and ProcessBufferTryDecodeSlhDsa all enforce per-parameter-set guards at the point where an algorithm is admitted into the session, a SHAKE variant that is not compiled in cannot appear in a live handshake.

Recommendation: For consistency with the SHA2 branch and to make dead-code elimination explicit, add per-parameter-set preprocessor guards around each SHAKE case in EncodeSigAlg. No functional or security change results; the improvement is defensive consistency.

This review was generated automatically by Fenrir. Findings are non-blocking.

wolfSSL-Fenrir-bot

Fenrir Automated Review — PR #10901

Scan targets checked: wolfcrypt-bugs, wolfcrypt-port-bugs, wolfcrypt-rs-bugs, wolfcrypt-src, wolfssl-bugs, wolfssl-src

Findings: 2
2 finding(s) posted as inline comments (see file-level comments below)

This review was generated automatically by Fenrir. Findings are non-blocking.

wolfSSL-Fenrir-bot

Fenrir Automated Review — PR #10901

Scan targets checked: wolfcrypt-bugs, wolfcrypt-port-bugs, wolfcrypt-rs-bugs, wolfcrypt-src, wolfssl-bugs, wolfssl-src

Findings: 2
2 finding(s) posted as inline comments (see file-level comments below)

This review was generated automatically by Fenrir. Findings are non-blocking.

wolfSSL-Fenrir-bot

Fenrir Automated Review — PR #10901

Scan targets checked: wolfcrypt-bugs, wolfcrypt-port-bugs, wolfcrypt-rs-bugs, wolfcrypt-src, wolfssl-bugs, wolfssl-src

Findings: 2
2 finding(s) posted as inline comments (see file-level comments below)

This review was generated automatically by Fenrir. Findings are non-blocking.

Implement SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+, FIPS 205) as an entity authentication algorithm for the TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 handshake, following draft-reddy-tls-slhdsa. All twelve parameter sets (SHAKE and SHA2 families, 128/192/256 in the f and s variants) are wired into the handshake for signing and verifying the CertificateVerify message; test certificates and configs cover the 128f and 128s sets. Handshake integration: - Map the SLH-DSA signature schemes to and from the wire in the signature_algorithms extension and CertificateVerify. The mapping, advertisement, and OID handling are gated per parameter set so a build only offers, accepts, and maps the variants actually compiled in (including partial SHA2 builds). - Sign and verify the CertificateVerify with an SLH-DSA entity key, and load SLH-DSA private keys and certificates (ssl_load.c, ssl.c, ssl_api_pk.c, asn.c). Streamed CertificateVerify send: - SLH-DSA signatures are large (up to ~50 KB). When the CertificateVerify body exceeds a single record, generate the signature into a connection-level buffer and emit it one record at a time so the output buffer never has to hold the whole signature. This keeps peak memory near one signature plus a single fragment and resumes correctly across a non-blocking WANT_WRITE without recomputing the randomized signature. Gated by WOLFSSL_TLS13_STREAM_CERT_VERIFY (TLS 1.3, non-async, PQC signatures); DTLS and WOLFSSL_ASYNC_CRYPT keep the existing in-place fragmented path. - Dual-algorithm (WOLFSSL_DUAL_ALG_CERTS, BOTH) CertificateVerify bodies are streamed as well. The combined two-signature body may include a variable-length signature, so the body buffer is sized from the per-signature upper bounds and the exact length is recorded after signing; the small trailing slack is never sent. Buffer sizing: - Make MAX_X509_SIZE parameter-aware for post-quantum certificates, sizing it from the largest enabled SLH-DSA or ML-DSA signature rather than a flat 8 KB that cannot hold an SLH-DSA-signed certificate. - Size the CertificateVerify and PreTBS buffers from the actual signature length instead of the worst-case WC_MAX_CERT_VERIFY_SZ, which balloons with SLH-DSA. WC_MAX_CERT_VERIFY_SZ is retained for API compatibility. Tests and certificates: - Add SLH-DSA entity (client and server) certificates for the SHAKE and SHA2 128f and 128s parameter sets, and update the generation script. - Add TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 entity-cert CertificateVerify test configs covering the fragmented (128f) and single-record (128s) send paths for both hash families, wired into suites.c.

Frauschi · 2026-07-17T12:52:48Z

Jenkins retest this please

Copilot

Pull request overview

This PR adds SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+, FIPS 205) as a TLS 1.3 / DTLS 1.3 CertificateVerify authentication algorithm, and updates handshake and certificate buffering logic to support very large post-quantum signatures without relying on oversized fixed buffers.

Changes:

Adds SLH-DSA signature-scheme mapping, key loading/decoding, and sign/verify integration for TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 handshakes.
Introduces a TLS 1.3 streamed CertificateVerify send path to avoid requiring the output buffer to hold an entire large signature at once.
Updates certificate / signature buffer sizing (e.g., MAX_X509_SIZE, WC_MAX_CERT_VERIFY_SZ) and adds new test configs + test cert material for SLH-DSA entity authentication.

Reviewed changes

Copilot reviewed 38 out of 46 changed files in this pull request and generated 2 comments.

Show a summary per file

File	Description
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/wc_slhdsa.h	Adds combined “family-absence” guards and a default parameter macro to keep size maxima correct across SHAKE/SHA2 builds.
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/asn.h	Updates `WC_MAX_CERT_VERIFY_SZ` definition and documents its API/back-compat intent under SLH-DSA.
wolfssl/internal.h	Adds SLH-DSA signature-scheme code points, adjusts `MAX_X509_SIZE`, and introduces the TLS 1.3 streamed CertificateVerify feature macro + buffer.
wolfcrypt/src/wc_slhdsa.c	Updates internal SLH-DSA buffer maxima selection to use combined guards across both hash families.
wolfcrypt/src/port/Renesas/renesas_tsip_util.c	Avoids sizing TSIP classic-hardware CertificateVerify buffers using the SLH-DSA-inflated worst-case macro.
wolfcrypt/src/asn.c	Uses a computed PreTBS bound for dual-alg alternative signature verification and allocates accordingly.
tests/test-tls13-slhdsa-entity.conf	Adds TLS 1.3 entity-certificate tests for SLH-DSA (fragmented path).
tests/test-tls13-slhdsa-entity-sha2.conf	Adds TLS 1.3 SHA2-family entity-certificate tests (fragmented path).
tests/test-tls13-slhdsa-entity-sha2-128s.conf	Adds TLS 1.3 SHA2-family entity-certificate tests (single-record path).
tests/test-tls13-slhdsa-entity-128s.conf	Adds TLS 1.3 SHAKE-family entity-certificate tests (single-record path).
tests/test-dtls13-slhdsa-entity.conf	Adds DTLS 1.3 entity-certificate tests for SLH-DSA (fragmented path).
tests/test-dtls13-slhdsa-entity-128s.conf	Adds DTLS 1.3 entity-certificate tests for SLH-DSA (single-record path).
tests/suites.c	Wires the new test configs into the suite runner behind appropriate compile-time guards.
tests/include.am	Adds the new SLH-DSA entity test config files to the dist list.
src/tls13.c	Implements SLH-DSA signature-scheme encode/decode, SLH-DSA key decode + verify, and streamed TLS 1.3 CertificateVerify send support.
src/ssl.c	Maps new SLH-DSA internal signature-algorithm IDs to OID/NID identifiers.
src/ssl_load.c	Adds SLH-DSA private-key “try decode” support in the key-loading probe chain.
src/ssl_api_pk.c	Adds SLH-DSA signature algorithm -> NID mapping support.
src/internal.c	Advertises SLH-DSA schemes (gated per parameter set), decodes SLH-DSA TLS schemes, and tracks “have SLH-DSA signature” capability.
src/dtls13.c	Documents DTLS fragmentation’s copy/peak-memory behavior and notes a future optimization for PQC signatures.
certs/slhdsa/server-slhdsa-shake-128s-priv.pem	Adds SLH-DSA SHAKE-128s server private key for tests.
certs/slhdsa/server-slhdsa-shake-128f-priv.pem	Adds SLH-DSA SHAKE-128f server private key for tests.
certs/slhdsa/server-slhdsa-sha2-128s-priv.pem	Adds SLH-DSA SHA2-128s server private key for tests.
certs/slhdsa/server-slhdsa-sha2-128f-priv.pem	Adds SLH-DSA SHA2-128f server private key for tests.
certs/slhdsa/client-slhdsa-shake-128s-priv.pem	Adds SLH-DSA SHAKE-128s client private key for tests.
certs/slhdsa/client-slhdsa-shake-128f-priv.pem	Adds SLH-DSA SHAKE-128f client private key for tests.
certs/slhdsa/client-slhdsa-sha2-128s-priv.pem	Adds SLH-DSA SHA2-128s client private key for tests.
certs/slhdsa/client-slhdsa-sha2-128f-priv.pem	Adds SLH-DSA SHA2-128f client private key for tests.
certs/slhdsa/include.am	Adds SLH-DSA entity cert/key artifacts to distribution list.
certs/slhdsa/gen-slhdsa-mldsa-certs.sh	Extends the cert generation script to produce SLH-DSA entity leaves for handshake tests.

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+                args->sendSz = RECORD_HEADER_SZ + HANDSHAKE_HEADER_SZ +
+                               HASH_SIG_SIZE + VERIFY_HEADER + (int)args->sigLen;
+            #ifdef WOLFSSL_DUAL_ALG_CERTS
+                args->sendSz += (int)args->altSigLen;
+            #endif


+#ifdef WOLFSSL_HAVE_SLHDSA
+/* ssl->peerCert->sapkiDer is the alternative public key. Hopefully it is an
+ * SLH-DSA public key. Convert it into a usable public key. */


Frauschi self-assigned this Jul 14, 2026

Frauschi force-pushed the slhdsa_tls_handshake branch 3 times, most recently from cf4f9cd to 417c06f Compare July 14, 2026 19:46

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Frauschi mentioned this pull request Jul 17, 2026

Add post-quantum (ML-DSA, SLH-DSA) signing support for CRLs Frauschi/wolfssl#23

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Frauschi force-pushed the slhdsa_tls_handshake branch from 9e96534 to 9991b12 Compare July 17, 2026 09:28

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Frauschi commented Jul 14, 2026

Summary

Motivation

What's included

Handshake integration

Streamed CertificateVerify send (large signatures)

Buffer sizing

Tests and certificates

Enabling

Scope / carve-outs

Testing

Known limitations / follow-ups

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Info (1)

SHAKE-variant SLH-DSA cases in EncodeSigAlg lack per-parameter-set guards

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