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| 1 | +# This CITATION.cff file was generated with cffinit. |
| 2 | +# Visit https://bit.ly/cffinit to generate yours today! |
| 3 | + |
| 4 | +cff-version: 1.2.0 |
| 5 | +title: >- |
| 6 | + Cross-Boundary Mobile Tracking: Exploring |
| 7 | + Java-to-JavaScript Information Diffusion in WebViews |
| 8 | +message: >- |
| 9 | + If you use this software, please cite it using the |
| 10 | + metadata from this file. |
| 11 | +type: software |
| 12 | +authors: |
| 13 | + - given-names: Sohom |
| 14 | + family-names: Datta |
| 15 | + email: sdatta4@ncsu.edu |
| 16 | + affiliation: North Carolina State University |
| 17 | + - given-names: Michalis |
| 18 | + family-names: Diamantaris |
| 19 | + affiliation: Technical University of Crete |
| 20 | + email: mdiamantaris@tuc.gr |
| 21 | + - given-names: Ahsan |
| 22 | + family-names: Zafar |
| 23 | + email: azafar2@ncsu.edu |
| 24 | + affiliation: North Carolina State University |
| 25 | + - affiliation: North Carolina State University |
| 26 | + given-names: Junhua |
| 27 | + family-names: Su |
| 28 | + email: jsu6@ncsu.edu |
| 29 | + - given-names: Anupam |
| 30 | + family-names: Das |
| 31 | + email: anupam.das@ncsu.edu |
| 32 | + affiliation: North Carolina State University |
| 33 | + - given-names: Jason |
| 34 | + family-names: Polakis |
| 35 | + email: polakis@uic.edu |
| 36 | + affiliation: University of Illinois Chicago |
| 37 | + - given-names: Alexandros |
| 38 | + family-names: Kapravelos |
| 39 | + email: akaprav@ncsu.edu |
| 40 | + affiliation: North Carolina State University |
| 41 | +identifiers: |
| 42 | + - type: doi |
| 43 | + value: 10.14722/ndss.2026.230910 |
| 44 | +repository-code: 'https://github.com/wspr-ncsu/WebViewTracer' |
| 45 | +url: 'https://go.ncsu.edu/webviewtracer' |
| 46 | +repository: 'https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.16687648' |
| 47 | +repository-artifact: 'https://doi.org/10.5061/dryad.05qfttffz' |
| 48 | +abstract: >- |
| 49 | + WebViews are a prevalent method of embedding web-based |
| 50 | + content in Android apps. While they offer functionality |
| 51 | + similar to that of browsers and execute in an isolated |
| 52 | + context, apps can directly interfere with WebViews by |
| 53 | + dynamically injecting JavaScript code at runtime. While |
| 54 | + prior work has extensively analyzed apps' Java code, |
| 55 | + existing frameworks have limited visibility of the |
| 56 | + JavaScript code being executed inside WebViews. |
| 57 | + Consequently, there is limited understanding of the |
| 58 | + behaviors and characteristics of the scripts executed |
| 59 | + within WebViews, and whether privacy violations occur. |
| 60 | +
|
| 61 | +
|
| 62 | + To address this gap, we propose WebViewTracer, a framework |
| 63 | + designed to dynamically analyze the execution of |
| 64 | + JavaScript code within WebViews at runtime. Our system |
| 65 | + combines within-WebView JavaScript execution traces with |
| 66 | + Java method-call information to also capture the |
| 67 | + information exchange occurring between Java SDKs and web |
| 68 | + scripts. We leverage WebViewTracer to perform the first |
| 69 | + large-scale, dynamic analysis of privacy-violating |
| 70 | + behaviors inside WebViews, on a dataset of 10K Android |
| 71 | + apps. We detect 4,597 apps that load WebViews, and find |
| 72 | + that over 69% of them inject sensitive and |
| 73 | + tracking-related information that is typically |
| 74 | + inaccessible to JavaScript code into WebViews. This |
| 75 | + includes identifiers like the Advertising ID and Android |
| 76 | + build ID. Crucially, 90% of those apps use web-based APIs |
| 77 | + to exfiltrate this information to third-party servers. We |
| 78 | + also uncover concrete evidence of common web |
| 79 | + fingerprinting techniques being used by JavaScript code |
| 80 | + inside WebViews, which can supplement their tracking |
| 81 | + information. We observe that the dynamic properties of |
| 82 | + WebViews are being actively leveraged for sensitive |
| 83 | + information diffusion across multiple actors in the mobile |
| 84 | + tracking ecosystem, demonstrating the privacy risks posed |
| 85 | + by Android WebViews. By shedding light on these ongoing |
| 86 | + privacy violations, our study seeks to prompt additional |
| 87 | + scrutiny from platform stakeholders on the use of embedded |
| 88 | + web technologies and highlights the need for additional |
| 89 | + safeguards. |
| 90 | +keywords: |
| 91 | + - dynamic analysis |
| 92 | + - browser instrumentation |
| 93 | + - privacy |
| 94 | + - WebViews |
| 95 | + - Android |
| 96 | + - VisibleV8 |
| 97 | + - advertising |
| 98 | +license: BSD-3-Clause |
| 99 | +commit: f08b19896ee00c438aefcedf1dd41ad142f0bfac |
| 100 | +version: '1.0' |
| 101 | +date-released: '2025-09-25' |
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