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@@ -104,5 +104,35 @@ US/EU data residency (2026-04-13). FedRAMP Moderate for US gov. `copilot --remot
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### 2026-04-15 -- ecosystem -- GitHub Actions April changes
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Workflow reruns capped at 50 (2026-04-10). OIDC for Dependabot/code scanning. Code scanning→Issues linking. Async SBOM exports.
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---
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## [2026-04-16] Daily Intelligence Update
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### gh-aw CLI v0.68.3 — New Frontmatter Fields
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-**`pre-steps:`** — Runs custom steps at job start, **before checkout**. Use for token minting or pre-checkout setup. Outputs accessible via `${{ steps.<id>.outputs.<name> }}` for use in `checkout.github-token` to avoid masked-value cross-job boundary issues. Same security restrictions as `steps:`.
-**`on.stale-check:`** — Boolean nested under `on:`, default `true`. When `false`, disables the frontmatter hash check in the activation job. Required for cross-repo org ruleset deployments.
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- Source: PR #26607 in github/gh-aw ("Sync github-agentic-workflows.md with v0.68.3", expires 2026-04-18)
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### gh-aw Security Fixes (active PRs 2026-04-16)
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-**Steganographic injection**: PR #26596 strips markdown link title text to close injection channel
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-**XPIA @mentions**: PR #26589 sanitizes @mentions in `create_issue` body
-**Copilot cloud agent per-org control** (April 15, 2026): Can now be enabled for selected organizations via AI Controls page → "Agent" → "Copilot Cloud Agent"
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-**REST API version 2026-03-10**: Available with breaking changes to the REST API
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---
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<!-- Append new entries above this line, newest first -->
- **Description:** Controls whether the activation job verifies that the frontmatter hash in the workflow matches its compiled `.lock.yml`.
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When `false`, disables the hash check step. This is needed when workflow files are managed outside the default repository context — for example, cross-repo org rulesets where the `.md` source and the compiled `.lock.yml` live in different repositories.
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```yaml
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on:
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schedule:
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- cron: '0 9 * * *'
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stale-check: false
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```
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---
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## 3. Permissions (`permissions:`)
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url: "https://app.example.com"
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```
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### `run-install-scripts` {#run-install-scripts}
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- **Type:** boolean
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- **Required:** no
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- **Default:** `false`
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- **Description:** Allow npm pre/post install scripts to execute during package installation.
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By default, gh-aw adds `--ignore-scripts` to all generated `npm install` commands to prevent supply chain attacks via malicious install hooks. Setting this to `true` disables that protection globally for all runtimes that generate `npm install` commands.
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```yaml
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run-install-scripts: true
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```
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**⚠️ Security notice:** Emits a supply chain security warning at compile time. In `strict` mode, this is a compile error rather than a warning.
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**Per-runtime scope:** To limit the opt-out to a specific runtime rather than all runtimes, use:
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```yaml
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runtimes:
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node:
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run-install-scripts: true
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```
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---
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## 5. Tools (`tools:`)
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## 8. Steps & Post-Steps
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### `pre-steps` {#pre-steps}
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- **Type:** object | array
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- **Required:** no
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- **Default:** none
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- **Description:** Custom workflow steps that run at the **very beginning** of the agent job, before the repository is checked out.
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```yaml
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pre-steps:
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- name: Mint app token
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id: app-token
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uses: actions/create-github-app-token@v2
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with:
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app-id: ${{ vars.APP_ID }}
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private-key: ${{ secrets.APP_KEY }}
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```
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**Use cases:**
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- **Token minting** that must happen before checkout (avoids masked-value cross-job boundary issues when the token is used in `checkout.github-token`)
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- Environment preparation that must precede repository access
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**Step outputs** are available via `${{ steps.<id>.outputs.<name> }}` and can be referenced in `checkout.github-token` and other pre-checkout fields.
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Same security restrictions apply as for `steps:` — runs outside the firewall sandbox with standard GitHub Actions security but no network egress controls.
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- **Cross-references:** `production-gotchas.md` — post-steps feature; see also `steps` and `post-steps`
**Pre-agent working-tree sanitization:** Before the agent job starts, `cache-memory` automatically scans the restored cache for planted executables and disallowed file types. Any neutralized files are logged as warnings in the workflow output. This protects against cache-poisoning attacks where a malicious actor could insert executable files or disallowed content into the cache between workflow runs.
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